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ABSTRACT
The escalating costs of environmental conflict have created incen-
tives for non-adversarial forms of environmental dispute resolution. In
recent years, a number of disputes have been succesfully resolved using
bargaining techniques such as negotiation and mediation. Many of the
techniques used in environmental bargaining have been adopted from col-
lective bargaining, but there are significant differences between en-
vironmental and labor disputes that prevent a simplistic transfer of
techniques. In particular, environmental disputes are more complex,
deal with notions of the "public interest", and, settlements may be dif-
ficult to implement.
One approach to the problems posed by environmental bargaining is
the participation of government agencies in the bargaining process. Be-
cause government agencies often have jurisdiction over the subject matter
of environmental disputes, they are in a unique position to implement
an agreement to which they were a party. Government agencies also can
bring their resources to bear on the complex factual problems in envir-
onmental disputes and offer other additional advantages to the bargain-
ing process. While in some cases an agency might not choose to participate
in environmental bargaining, the incentives to participate -- especially
gaining voluntary compliance with regulations and avoiding conflict --
appear sufficient to insure agency participation in some cases.
Models for agency participation already exist. The consent order, used
primarily in antitrust and trade regulation cases, may be altered slightly
and adopted for use as an alternative to court judgments in enforcement ac-
- 6 -
tions. Agencies may also pursue formal and bargaining processes simultane-
ously in permitting or licensing processes, and use the environmental im-
pact statement process as a mechanism for beginning informal discussions
with contending parties.
When government agencies participate in environmental bargaining, how-
ever, their actions may "trigger" the disclosure provisions of "open meetings"
and "right to know laws". Because disclosure of information that the parties
want to keep confidential may endanger the bargaining process, it may be
necessary to inquire whether an agency may maintain the confidentiality of
such information. Both the legislative history and court interpretation of
these statutes indicate.that a strong argument may be made for confidenti-
ality.
Finally, the participation of government agencies in ad hoc, informal
processes may raise concerns about agency abuse of discretion. But where
the decisionmaking process is consensual and agencies are required to
structure their own rules before entering into a bargaining process, the
problem of discretion seems less critical. As a final safeguard against
abuse of discretion, court review 2hould be provided for the procedural
sufficiency of agency actions in environmental dispute resolution proces-
ses.
- 7
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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the environment movement in the United States over
the past two decades has produced far-reaching changes in our political and
economic system. Early this year, for example, construction of a major dam
was halted because it posed a potential danger to the habitat of the snail
darter, a tiny sand-colored fish whose existence was not even known until
1
1973. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) estimated that some
$40.6 billion was spent on pollution control in 1977, of which $18.1 bil-
lion was mandated by various federal and state environmental protection
2
laws. These are just two illustrations of the potent counterforce to tra-
ditional economic interests created by the environmental movement. The
empowering of environmentalists through legislation -- and, equally impor-
tant, through judicial interpretation of legislation -- has enabled envi-
ronmental interests to contend with traditional economic interests; the re-
sulting conflict has been intense, costly, and is spreading.3
Environmental conflict4 is often characterized by "all or nothing"
attitudes on the part of disputants. Such disputes are resolved on a "win-
1See "The clash of men and minnow," The Boston Globe, January 21,
1979, Sec. D at 1.
2See "Council on Environmental Quality Issues Annual Report," The
New York Times, March 1, 1978, p. 14 at 4.
See T. Gladwin, "The Management of Environmental Conflict: A Survey
of Research Approaches and Priorities," published as a Working Paper,
Faculty of Business Administration, New York University (1978); see also
Bowman, "The Environmental Movement: An Assessment of Ecological Politics,"
5 Env. Aff. 649 (1976); Marcus, "The disproportionate power of environmen-
talists," 2 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 582 (1977); Ragsdale, "Ecology and the Role
of the Federal Courts," 46 U.M.K.C.L.R. 221 (1977).
4I will also use the term "environmental dispute" in this paper. No
distinction is implied, the two terms may be used interchangeably.
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ner take all" basis following expensive litigation and complex legal man-
euvering. In some cases, the nuclear power plant at Seabrook, New Hamp-
shire being most notable, the conflict has broadened to include extra-legal
actions such as demonstrations and massive civil disobedience where there
was dissatisfaction with the results obtained through legal processes.5
In the past few years, however, new approaches to resolving environ-
mental conflict have been attempted and, in some instances, have been suc-
cessful. Called environmental mediation, or dispute avoidance, or just
plain negotiation, these approaches share a critical element: each is an
effort to resolve environmental disputes through consensus and compromise
rather than by adversarial legal procedures. All of the suggested approach-
es seek to minimize conflict and foster decision-making that employs bar-
gaining and discussion.6
In speaking about environmental mediation and the other forms of con-
flict resolution, it is critical that we distinguish the principal features
of each method. Although there is, as yet, no formal definition of environ-
mental mediation, a working definition has been advanced by Gerald W.
McCormick, Director of the Office of Environmental Mediation at the Univer-
sity of Washington's Institute for Environmental Studies:
5See Weinstein, "Seabrook: A Case Study of Environmental Conflict,"
Energy Impacts Project, Technical Report No. 15, MIT Laboratory of Archi-
tecture and Planning (1979).
6See O'Connor, "Environmental Mediation: The State-of-the Art,"
2 EIA Review 9 (October, 1978); Environmental Comment (May, 1977), which
devoted this entire issue to environmental conflict resolution; Environ-
mental Mediation: An Effective Alternative? a report of a conference
held in Reston, Virginia, January 11 - 13,.1978, sponsored by RESOLVE,
Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution, The Aspen Institute for
Humanistic Studies and.the Sierra Club Foundation. (Hereafter cited as
Environmental Mediation.)
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Mediation is a voluntary process in which those involved in
a dispute jointly explore and reconcile their differences.
The mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His
or her strength lies in the ability to assist the parties
in resolving their own differences. The mediated dispute
is settled when the parties themselves reach what they con-
sider to be a workable solution.7
Professor Fuller has identified the crucial role of the mediator in the
process of dispute resolution: the mediator has the "capacity to reorient
the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping
them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a per-
ception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one
another."8
In contrast to mediation, which is characterized principally by the
use of, and need for, a neutral third party, "negotiation" is a method for
consensual agreement in which only the principal parties participate. The
disputants are able to reach a voluntary settlement themselves without the
assistance of an intermediary.
To avoid confusion later, I must emphasize that the words mediation
and negotiation will have a specific meaning in this thesis. The confusion
arises, of course, because even in the process of mediation we ordinarily
say that the parties are "negotiating," i.e., they are involved in the give-
and-take of bargaining. Further, both negotiation and mediation processes
may be utilized in the same dispute. If a negotiation effort between the
principal parties fails, a mediator may be invited to join the bargaining
sessions in the hope of achieving a settlement. I will attempt to avoid
confusion by using the word "bargaining," rather than "negotiation," when
7Environmental Mediation, supra note 6 at 2
8Fuller, "Mediation -- Its Forms and Functions," 44 So. Cal. L. Rev.
305, 325 (1971).
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I describe the Drocess of discussion and compromise that leads to an agree-
ment, and will label agreements either as negotiated settlements or mediated
settlements, depending on which process was used.
There is great interest in environmental mediation,9 due largely to
the growing perception that the costs of environmental conflict have become
too great, and the recognition, by the contending parties, that victory is
seldom assured and too often Pyrrhic.10 The growing number and intensity
of environmental disputes has also placed an added strain on already over-
burdened courts, creating further incentives to lessen conflict.1 1
Our experience to date with environmental conflict resolution suggests
that it may provide an attractive alternative to our current processes.
Environmental mediation and negotiation have been able to lower the costs
of dispute resolution, and, significantly, lessen the constraints imposed
by traditional legal processes on environmental decision-making.1 2
9In addition to the Reston Conference, supra note 6; other recent
conferences on environmental dispute resolution include: The American Arbi-
tration Association's "Arbitration Day" held in New York City, May, 1978;
the Environmental Law Institute's "NEPA III" Conference held in Reston,
Virginia, November 30-December 1, 1978; and a conference sponsored by the
Environmental Law Society of Syracuse University held in Syracuse, New York,
February 3, 1979: "Negotiation and Mediation -- Alternatives and Tradi-
tional Models."
1 0See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 57.
1 1See D. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (1977); "Discussion:
Crisis in the Courts," 31 Vand. L. R. 1 (1978); Rifkind, "Are We Asking Too
Much of Our Courts?" 70 F.R.D. 101 (the Pound Conference) (1976).
David Bazelon, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has expressed the fear that in many new areas of
agency rule-making, the exercise of substantive review "dangerously taxes
the court's competence," in Carter, "Comment: The Environment -- An Agency-
Court Battle," 17 Nat. Res. J. 122 (1977).
1 2 See pp. 34-35infra; see also Whitney, "Technical and Scientific
Evidence in Administrative Adjudication," 45 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 37 (1976);
Boyer, "Alternatives to Administrative Trial-type Hearings for Resolving
Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues," 71 Mich. L. Rev. 111
(1972).
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Certainly, environmental mediation will not be the solution to all
environmental conflict. Its use will neither end litigation nor bring a
halt to the continuing battle between environmental and developmental in-
terests. Mediation, and other forms of consensual conflict resolution,
will not be applicable to all environmental disputes, perhaps not even to
a great many, but the consensus of the participants in a January, 1978,
conference on environmental mediation -- the largest and most comprehen-
sive such meeting to date -- was that this new approach to environmental
disputes offers enough promise to justify vigorous efforts to apply it to
real conflicts.
Because many practitioners of environmental dispute resolution gain-
ed their practical experience in conflict management through labor negoti-
ations, a great deal has been learned from the procedures of collective
bargaining. But there are significant differences between environmental
and labor disputes that militate against a simplistic transfer of tech-
niques from collective bargaining to environmental-mediation or negotia-
tion. For example, most labor disputes involve two parties whose interests
are clearly defined and who are acknowledged to be the legitimate parties
to a bargaining process. An environmental dispute may affect many parties,
however, each with a slightly different interest at stake, and all of whom
may want to become actively involved in determining the outcome of the dis-
pute.
Many other differences exist,15 but one that is particularly critical
1 3See supra note 6.
1 4See Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 2-3.
1 5See pp.35-50infra.
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is the question of implementing an agreement once it has been reached. In
collective bargaining agreements, there is little doubt that the settle-
ment agreed to by the parties can and will be implemented by management.
With environmental disputes, implementation is much trickier.16 Experien-
ced mediators agree that implementation problems are a major concern in
conseisual settlements of environmental disputes: parties may not have
the legal authority to implement their agreement; novel agreements may
pose difficult questions of interpretation when implementation is attemp-
ted; and disgruntled members of participating organizations may form
"splinter groups" and seek to frustrate implementation.1 7
One approach to solving the special problems of environmental dis-
putes is to encourage the participation of government in the bargaining
process. In this thesis I will argue that government participation in
negotiation and mediation of environmental disputes can help to address
some of the particular difficulties encountered in environmental conflict
resolution and, importantly, can also provide less costly, speedier, and
more innovative solutions to environmental conflict.
Summary
Chapter One traces the forces that have created a demand for envi-
1 6See pp. 3 6 -40infra.
1 7Interviews with: Jane McCarthy, Environmental Mediator (currently
engaged in research for the American Arbitration Association), New York
City, March 2, 1979; David O'Connor, Environmental Mediator (currently as-
sociated with Clark-McGlennon Associates), Boston, March 8, 1979; John
McGlennon, former Administrator of EPA Region I (currently a principal of
Clark-McGlennon Associates), Boston, March 15, 1979.
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ronmental conflict resolution, showing how the empowering of the environ-
mental movement, by creating a potent counterforce to traditional economic
interests, has produced conflicts which are now imposing costs on institu-
tions, individuals, and society that seem unnecessarily large. Chapter Two
considers some of the particular problems of environmental dispute resolu-
tion and indicates the potential advantages of government participation in
the bargaining process. Chapter Three illustrates some of the methods and
contexts available for government participation in environmental dispute
resolution. Chapter Four examines legal questions raised by government
participation in environmental dispute resolution, focusing on the conflict
between government's need to maintain the confidentiality of bargaining
and the public's right to know how its government is operating. Finally,
in the Conclusion, I present a set of recommendations for action and indi-
cate some worthwhile avenues for further exploration.
- 16 -
CHAPTER ONE
INCENTIVES TO RESOLVE ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES OUT-OF-COURT
Introduction
A number of converging forces have created incentives for consensual
approaches to environmental dispute resolution. The .growth and empowering
of the environmental movement over the past two decades is one important
factor. When environmental interest groups achieved sufficient legal and
political power to delay large-scale development projects or influence
major policy decisions, they could no longer be ignored or intimidated.
The ensuing conflict has been intense and costly.
Faced with the very real possibility that an important project will
be blocked, or at least delayed, business and development interests have a
significant incentive to consider negotiations and bargaining as alterna-
tives to protracted agency hearings and lengthy court battles.
The spiraling inflation of recent years has provided an impetus to-
wards bargaining for both sides. Clearly, for business and development in-
terests the escalation of costs due to delay can account for an increased
willingness to negotiate rather than risk drawn-out legal battles. In an
inflationary era, once capital is committed delay is just too costly. It
is less obvious, but equally true, that inflation and other economic ills
are pushing environmentalists toward compromise and bargaining. With eco-
nomic and energy issues now in the forefront, environmental groups recog-
nize that they may not enjoy the degree of popular, and political, support
they had just a few years ago. With the support needed for victory no
longer so certain, compromise is an acceptable alternative to risking all-
out defeat. This trend has been further strengthened by recent changes in
- 17 -
the law that have reduced the ability of environmental litigants to delay
proposed developments by appeal to the federal courts.18 Taken together,
these developments have created powerful incentives towards the resolution
of environmental disputes out-of-court.
The Growth of the Environmental Movement
Although environmentalism in the United States traces its immediate
roots to the nineteenth century,19 its emergence as a popular national
movement dates back only two decades. Beginning in 1962, with the publi-
cation of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, a quick succession of new ideas
and disturbing events focused the attention of many Americans on the prob-
lems of pollution and resource allocation. Books such as The Population
20
Bomb and The Closing Circle, headlines about smog in Los Angeles and a
"dying" Lake Erie, pictures of the disastrous Santa Barbara oil spill, and
the popularized notion of "spaceship earth" sharpened public awareness of
environmental issues and spurred the clamor for action.21 Environmental
1 8 ee___See pp.25-27infra.
1 9The Sierra Club, for example, was established in 1892 as a result
of John Muir's fight to have Yosemite Valley designated a state park. See
Cohn, "The Environmental Ethic," at 13, in Values of Growth (1976).
2P. Ehrlich, The Population Bomb (1968); B. Commoner, The Closing
Circle (1972).
2 1 Consider the following excerpt from the Council on Environmental
Quality's (CEQ) first report:
The public has begun to realize the interrelationship of'all
living things -- including man -- with the environment. The
Santa Barbara oil spill in early 1969 showed an entire nation
how one accident could temporarily blight a large area. Since
then, each environmental use. . . flashed the sign to Americans
that the problems are everywhere and affect everyone.
CEQ, Environmental Quality (1970) at 6.
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consciousness spread quickly. The nation marked Earth Day on April 22,
1970, and, on millions of television screens, the Forest Service's fire-
fighting Smokey the Bear was upstaged by Woodsey the Owl, advising us all
to "Give a Hoot -- Don't Pollute!"
By the late 1960s, environmentalism had clearly gathered sufficient
22
strength and breadth of support to be dubbed a social movement. Further,
because its adherents could be found among Republicans and Democrats, lib-
erals and conservatives, it was a movement with the capacity to translate
the concerns of its members into legislative action. Between 1969 and 1972,
environmentalists scored numerous political victories, capped by the pas-
sage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),24 and the halting of action on
major projects, including the Cross-Florida Barge Canal and development of
an American supersonic transport (SST).25 Within several years a signifi-
cant body of federal environmental law was created,26 and the states were
2 2See Bowman, supra note 3, at 651.
2342 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976), as amended.
2 4See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, President's Special Message
to the Congress about Reorganization Plans to Establish the Environmental
Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Pub. Papers 215-16 (July 9, 1970).
2 5See W. Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern (1977) at 6.
E.g, Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601; Coastal Zone
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531;
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251; Marine Protection, Re-
search, and Sanctuaries Act, @ 1401; Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §
300f; National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U,S.C. 9 4321; Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(1976).
Vew
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not far behind.2 7
The actions of the legislative and executive branches became even
more significant as a result of developments occurring in the federal
courts. In liberalizing the rules of standing28 and agreeing to take a
29
"hard look" at administrative decisions in environmental cases, the
federal courts opened their doors to a flood of environmental litigation
that in turn added significant procedural and substantive rights to those
already granted by statute.30 Taken together, these changes in popular
perceptions and in legal rights provided environmentalists with enough
2 7See McQuire, "Emerging State Programs to Protect the Environment:
'Little NEPAs and Beyond," 8 Env. L. Rev. 623 (1977); T. Trzyna and A.
Jakela, The California Environmental Quality Act (1974); Frye, "Environ-
mental Provisions in State Constitutions," 5 Env. L. Rep. 500028 (1975);
DiMento, "Citizen Environmental Legislation in the States: An Overview,"
53 J. Urb. Law 413 (1975).
2 8 See SCRAP v. United States, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159
(1970); see also Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law,"
88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1723-47 (1975).
2 9 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971); EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 942; Leventhal, "Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role
of the Courts," 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509 (1974); F. Anderson, NEPA in the
Courts (1973); R. Andrews, Environmental Policy and Administrative Change
(1976); R. Liroff, A National Policy for the Environment (1976).
3 0The federal courts remain split, however, on a major question re-
garding the interpretation of NEPA: should the courts examine agency de-
cisions only for their procedural sufficiency (how they decided) or, should
the substance of the decision be the subject of judicial review as well
(what they decided)? The 8th Circuit has endorsed substantive review. See
EDF v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham Dam), 470 F. 2d 289 (1972); Minnesota
PIRG v. Butz, 541 F. 2d 1292 (1976). Other circuits have also adopted this
view. See Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F. 2d
664 (4th Cir. 1973). Still others have not. See Lathan v. Brinegar, 506
F. 2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F. 2d 995
(10th Cir. 1973). See also Oakes, "Substantive Judicial Review in Environ-
mental Law," 7 ELR 50029 (1977); Note, "The Least Adverse Alternative Ap-
proach to Substantive Review under NEPA," 88 Harv. L. Rev. 735 (1975)
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political and legal clout to oppose traditional economic forces, often
with great success.31
The Costs of Conflict
Clearly, we have reaped substantial benefits from the pollution
abatement and resource allocation programs which the environmental movement
helped to create. Strict emission standards are in force for auto and in-
dustrial air pollution, we are attempting to manage the development of
unique coastal areas so that their scenic value and worth as wildlife habi-
tats is not destroyed, and we have become sensitive to the possibly catas-
trophic environmental impact posed by toxic substances, indiscriminate use
of fluorocarbons, and other dangers.
These benefits are typically not shared equally, however, and neither
are the costs of environmental protection. Clearly, substantial costs have
resulted from the delays caused by extended environmental litigation and
regulatory reviews. Some of these have been borne by business interests.
The carrying costs on large-scale land development projects, the opportun-
ity costs associated with often-delayed energy facility projects, and the
inflationary impact of rising material and labor costs have fallen heavily
on developers, industrialists, and corporate bond and share holders. To the
extent that market forces permit, many of these costs have been passed on to
consumers (the legendary "average" citizen) in the form of higher prices;
but businesses have also had to bear a part of the cost in the form of re-
duced profit margins.
1U.
3 1See p. 18 supra.
- 21 -
Environmentalists also claim costs from the delay caused by environ-
mental disputes, pointing to the "costs" they have incurred when prolonged
legal actions delay implementation of tougher codes and standards or allow
development to proceed in areas where the loss of habitats or species is
irreversible. Here again, it is the "average" citizen who probably bears
most of the costs; at times, tragically, in the form of increased morbid-
ity (or mortality) rates.
Some of the costs of environmental conflict are less obvious. To win
a relatively small number of precedent-setting cases, environmental groups
have had to devote enormous sums of money to protracted litigation while
the larger tasks of public education and political action have been short-
changed.32 Business and development interests have lost substantial flex-
ibility because capital has been tied up in projects that could not proceed.
Government has been forced to expand its regulatory apparatus to handle
33
the additional demands created by drawn-out environmental litigation.
Changes in the Political and Legal Climate
In the past few years, a number of changes in the political and legal
climate have accelerated the movement towards compromise and bargaining in
32For example, in 1977, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
devoted $1.5 million, more than half its total budget, to environmental
litigation and associated activities -- primarily scientific support for the
litigation. By contrast, NRDC's public education efforts received only one-
tenth the funding of litigation, a mere $136,000. Similarly, the Environ-
mental Defense Fund (EDF), in 1977, devoted $854,000, slightly more than
half its total budget, to environmental litigation. See Natural Resources
Defense Council Annual Report, 1977; Environmental Defense Fund Annual Re-
port, 1977.
33 See Bardach & Pugliaresi, "The Environmental Impact Statement vs.
the Real World", 49 Pub. Interest 22 (1977).
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the settlement of environmental disputes. Perhaps most important, business
interests have begun to recognize that the empowering of the environmental-
ists is a reality that they will have to live with; they have begun to alter
their behavior accordingly.
An example of this trend towards business' acceptance of the need to
negotiate with environmental interests can be seen in a recent publication
of the Practicing Law Institute intended for use by corporate counsel. In
a section entitled "Negotiations, Compromise, Interaction, and Diverse In-
terests," the corporate attorney is advised to "meet with environmental
groups and government agencies as early as possible" and to "involve them
as much as possible" in project planning. Further examples of the growing
willingness of business interests to negotiate with environmentalists in-
clude the recently concluded work of the National Coal Policy Project, an
effort, initiated by business interests, to reach a consensus on a national
policy for the development and use of coal35 and, of course, the very set-
tlements that will be examined in the following sections of this thesis.
The increasing willingness of business and development interests to
negotiate is matched by a similar inclination on the part of the environ-
mentalists. Environmentalism -- like any social movement -- was a creature
34
See Friedman, "Environmental Checklist," in Environmental Law for
the Corporate Counsel (1978) at 335. To be sure, the millenium has not
yet arrived. At the end of this same section the author notes that "The
need to meet with public interest groups is seen by many corporate execu-
tives as interferences with the running of their business."
3 5See Where We Agree: Report of the National Coal Policy Project
(1978); see also M. Wessel, The Rule of Reason (1976).
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of its time.36 Current popular concerns are focused on the problems of
energy, inflation, and employment. Environmental groups may be fearing
some loss of momentum. In this situation, a strategy of compromise is both
a good public relations posture and, moreover, a hedge against a clear de-
feat in a "win-lose" confrontation where popular, and political, support
37
may be insufficient to guarantee victory.
Another push toward out-of-court, voluntary dispute resolution is
the growing dissatisfaction with the role of the courts and administrative
agencies in environmental decision-making.38 A number of critics have
3 6See Bowman, supra note 3, at 657. It certainly seems unlikely that
we will again see anything like the federal legislative response to the
environmental movement, and not merely because, witn many laws already in
force, the need is less. The Kennedy-Johnson administrations -- combining
"New Frontier" optimism in the nation's ability to solve its problems with
"Great Society" beliefs in new programs and increased spending as the
solution -- furnished both the precedents and momentum for the environmen-
tal legislation of the Nixon-Ford years. Now, with Proposition 13 "fever"
sweeping the land, inflation once again shooting upward, and some of our
largest cities facing fiscal collapse, fears of increased government spend-
ing place a significant restraint on the political system and new programs
are eyed suspiciously by voters.
3 7This past summer provided an interesting example of the abandonment
of confrontation strategy by an environmental group. The Clamshell Alli-
ance, an activist group protesting construction of a nuclear power plant
at Seabrook, New Hampshire, had scheduled an illegal occupation of the
plant site for the weekend of June 24, 1978. Plans called for an even lar-
ger demonstration than that held the previous year when over 1,400 protes-
tors had been arrested. When it became clear that these plans were leading
to a possible violent confrontation with state police and further mass ar-
rests, Clamshell leaders chose to compromise and avoid the conflict. Nego-
tiations between the group's leaders and New Hampshire Attorney General
Thomas Rath produced an agreement that gave state approval to a peaceful
three-day rally and "Energy Fair" near the plant site. Over 15,000 people
attended the rally, there was no trouble, and both sides seemed happy with
the solution. See Weinstein, supra note 5, at 44-47.
3 8See Kennedy, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istrative Agencies," 29 Admin. L. Rev. v (Chairman's Message) (1977); Vol-
ner, "Identifying the Causes of Failure of the Regulatory Commissions,"
5 Hofstra L. Rev. 285 (1977); Leventhal, supra note 29.
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questioned the ability of agencies to deal with the complexities of envi-
39
ronmental problems, or even whether government regulation is the correct
approach to protecting the environment.40 Other observers question the wis-
dom of having the courts settle difficult social and economic disputes in
which substantive and not procedural questions are at issue.41 Some agen-
cies have responded to this criticism by restructuring administrative pro-
cedures to emphasize decision-making outside the traditional adjudicatory
boundaries.42 The judiciary is also seeking to redefine its role, consi-
dering alternative methods of dispute resolution, including mediation and
arbitration.43
3 9See Boyer, supra note 12, at 141; Whitney, supra note 12.
4 0See "Colloquium: The Deregulation of Industry," 51 Ind. L. J. 682
(1976). The recent economics literature has been particularly concerned
with the problem of regulation in the environmental field. See W. Baumol
and W. Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy: Externalities., Public
Outlays, and the Quality of Life (1975); A. Kneese, Economics and the
Environment (1977); R. Dorfman and N. Dorfman (eds.), Economics of the
Environment (2d ed. 1977).
4 1See Horowitz, supra note 11; Rifkind, supra note 11; Stewart,
supra note 28, at 1772-73.
This trend may be seen both in the use of traditional, but nonad-
judicatory, agency procedures such as generic rule-making, and in wholly
nontraditional procedures such as mediation. See "Pounds of Cure: General
Electric Agrees to PCB Abatement, Cleanup and Research," 6 ELR 10225 (1976)
(Mediated settlement of suit brought against G.E. by New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation, where mediator was regulatory agency
hearing officer and mediation occurred under auspices of the regulatory
body).
4 3See Burger, "Agenda for 2000 A.D. -- A Need for Systematic Antici-
pation," 70 F.R.D. 79 (The Pound Conference) (1976); Sander, "Varieties of
Dispute Processing," 70 F.R.D. 111 (The Pound Conference) (1976). The
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals has initiated a pilot project,
the Volunteer Masters Pilot Program, which is attempting to lessen the bur-
den on the courts by using volunteer lawyers to "explore the possibility of
mediating and settling the controversy. . .seek to clarify and narrow the
issues involved. . . ." Additional information on this pilot program may be
obtained from: Second Circuit Commission on the Reduction of Burdens and
Costs in Civil Litigation, One Chase Manhattan Plaza, New York, NY 10005.
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Finally, although environmentalists have enjoyed great success in
prosecuting environmental litigation, a recent Supreme Court decision may
limit that success in future cases which attempt to challenge federal admin-
istrative decisions on procedural grounds; heretofore an important litiga-
tion strategy for environmental groups. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court con-
sidered two decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit invalidating the grant of licenses to nuclear power plants by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The lower court, in each case, found
that the NRC failed to adopt procedures which, in the court's opinion, would
fully explore and document certain of the potential environmental conse-
quences of the proposed plants.46 The Supreme Court reversed both decisions
47in a sharply-worded opinion written by Justice Rehnquist for a unanimous
Court,48 and enunciated the principle that federal reviewing courts, with
rare exceptions, are not empowered to require that federal administrative
4498 S. Ct. 1197 (1978). For an extended discussion of the logic of
the case, and its potential impact, see "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives," 91 Harv.
L. Rev. 1804 (1978).
4 5The potential impact of Vermont Yankee is due, in some part, to the
fact that it was the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
that was reversed. The D.C. Court had long been receptive to arguments al-
leging insufficient administrative procedures and, because of its appellate
jurisdiction over federal agencies, was uniquely available as a forum for
environmental litigation. If one chooses to view this court as standing
for aggressive judicial review of federal agency decision-making regarding
the environment, then the sharply-worded rebuke of the lower court's reason-
ing takes on added significance.
4 6 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. NRC, 547 F.
2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F. 2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
4 7Justice Rehnquist criticized the lower court's rulings as "judicial
intervention run riot" and at one point called its reasoning "Kafkaesque."
4 8 The court voted 7-0, Justices Blackmun and Powell not participating.
1
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agencies employ formal decision-making procedures beyond those specified by
Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)49 or in specific stat-
utes.50
The Court had taken the case, Rehnquist noted, because of its concern
that the D.C. Circuit had "seriously misread or misapplied. . .statutory
and decisional law against engrafting their own notions of proper proce-
dures upon agencies. . . ."5 The APA provisions, in the view of the Court,
were an authoritative "formula upon which opposing social and political
forces have come to rest," precluding judicial imposition of additional
procedures.52 Rehnquist argued that if courts were free to impose their
own notions of procedures "perfectly tailored to reach what the Court per-
ceives to be the 'best' or 'correct' result, judicial review would be to-
tally unpredictable.,,53 As a result, agencies, unsure as to the standard
4 9The NRC had utilized notice and comment rule-making procedures
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, in which NRC staff
and outside parties submitted written documents, replies, and oral state-
ments, but in which cross-examination and other formalities of an adjudi-
catory hearing were excluded. The D.C. Court found that these procedures
had failed to "ventilate" adequately the critical issue of nuclear waste
fuel disposal, and that rccordingly, there was not a suffficient basis in
the record to sustain the NRC's grant of a license.
Following the ruling in this case (Aeschliman), the NRC ordered a
moratorium on all nuclear power plant licensing activities and ordered
that all existing licenses and permits be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.
It was this judicial invalidation of notice and comment generic rule-
making under the APA that apparently catalyzed the Supreme Court's response.
Although the Vermont Yankee opinion also warns against too much interven-
tion by reviewing courts when judging the results of adjudicatory adminis-
trative hearings, the thrust of the opinion is clearly directed toward the
judicial role in reviewing agency rule-making processes.
5098 S. Ct. 1197, supra note 44, at 1202.
5198 S. Ct. 1197, supra note 44, at 1213.
5 2 d52Id.
53 d
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a court would apply and fearing reversal, would adopt full adjudicatory
procedures in every case, thereby disrupting the statutory scheme enacted
by Congress in the APA and losing all the advantages of less formal pro-
ceedings.54
The Vermont Yankee decision should serve to expand the area of ad-
ministrative agency discretion and will dissuade reviewing courts, in the
future, from attempting "to impose upon the agency its own notion of which
procedures are 'best' or more likely to further some vague, undefined pub-
lic good.,55 While commentators have differed upon the wisdom of the deci-
sion, they agree that it limits the procedural formalities that courts may
impose on administrative agencies.56 This, in turn, will tend to reduce
the ability of environmental groups to delay a "final" decision through ap-
peal of agency decisions on procedural grounds, up until Vermont Yankee a
potent weapon in environmental litigation. Absent this weapon, environmen-
tal groups may find dispute resolution -- and compromise -- a more attrac-
tive alternative to "win-or-lose" litigation.
5498 S. Ct. 1197, supra note 44, at 1213.
5 5 Id.
5 6See "Vermont Yankee. . .," supra note 44.
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CHAPTER TWO
HOW AGENCY PARTICIPATION CAN PROMOTE BARGAINING AND SETTLEMENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
Introduction
As the costs of environmental conflict have grown, and the forces
moving the contending actors towards compromise strengthened, there has
been a rapid development of interest in consensual processes as a novel
approach to resolving environmental disputes. Several centers for environ-
mental mediation have been opened,57 private consulting firms have become
involved in mediation efforts,58 and significant research in the field has
gotten underway. 5 9
Despite this growing interest in environmental dispute resolution --
and the success of many of the initial attempts at resolving disputes using
57
Centers for environmental mediation currently in operation include:
RESOLVE, Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution, Palo Alto, Califor-
nia; Office of Environmental Mediation, Institute for Environmental Stu-
dies, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; Rocky Mountain Center
on the Environment (ROMCOE), Denver, Colorado; American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA) Center for Dispute Resolution, New York, New York; Wisconsin
Center for Public Policy, Madison, Wisconsin; Office of Dispute Settle-
ment, Department of the Public Advocate, State of New Jersey, Trenton, New
Jersey.
5 8These include: Rivkin Associates, Washington, D.C.; Clark-McGlen-
non Associates, Boston, Massachusetts; Toner & Toner, San Francisco, Cali-
fornia.
59
RESOLVE has prepared an annotated bibliography, "Selected Readings
in Environmental Conflict Resolution," which lists over fifty published or
printed articles dealing with various aspects of environmental mediation,
including: Case Studies; Conflict and Conflict Management Theory; Environ-
mental Conflict Management; Tools Techniques, and Processes; and the Sci-
ence Court Concept. RESOLVE has also sponsored research efforts by Scott
Mernitz, whose doctoral dissertation at the University of Wisconsin,
"Mediation of Environmental Disputes: An Evaluation of its Potential and
its Geographic Effects" (1978), will be published by RESOLVE and Praeger
this year under a slightly different title.
The American Arbitration Association is funding research conducted by
Jane McCarthy, an experienced mediator, through its Center for Dispute
Resolution.
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environmental mediation -- a number of difficulties inherent in this ap-
proach were identified at the Reston conference in 1978. Gerald Cormick
told the conference that after reviewing approximately sixty environmental
6 0There have been significant successes in mediating environmental
disputes over the past few years. In particular, Gerald W. Cormick, Jane
McCarthy, Leah Patton, and Alice Shorett, of the University of Washington's
Office of Environmental Mediation, have mediated a number of disputes in
the state of Washington.
In the Snoqualmie/Snohomish case, Cormick and McCarthy voluntarily
entered a land use dispute involving plans for flood control in a river
valley populated largelv by farmers. The farmers were concerned that the
Drooosed dam for flood control would spur uncontrolled development of the
river basin, leading to unsightly and damaging sprawl. A published account
of their resolution of this dispute is found in Cormick, "Mediating Envi-
ronmental Controversies: Perspectives and First Experience," 2 Earth L.
J. 215 (1976).
In the Interstate 1-90 case, Cormick and Patton were appointed by the
Governor to mediate a dispute involving the city of Seattle, various envi-
ronmental and citizens' groups, the State Highway Commission, and the sub-
urban communities of Bellevue and Mercer Island. At issue were plans for
a ten-lane interstate highwav-transitway combination supported by the sub-
urban communities but ooposed by Seattle and the citizens' groups. A brief
account of the disDute is available in "Environmental Mediation: Poten-
tials and Limitations," Environmental Comment (May, 1977).
In the Paine Field case, Cormick's group was appointed by the Sno-
homish County Commission to mediate the planning process for the develop-
ment of Paine Field, the Snohomish County Airport. Their successful ef-
forts led to an agreement which permits further airport development plans
so long as they are compatible with county-wide land use goals and are sen-
sitive to the quality of life of nearby residents. No published account is
yet available.
In the Port of Everett case, Cormick's group formed a mediation com-
mittee that assists the Port in developing guidelines leading to a Compre-
hensive Port Plan that reflects Everett's diverse urban needs and the qual-
ity and character of the city's future. The Dlan renresents a comoromise
between those who favored commercial develooment of the Port and others
who sought to protect the Port's recreational facilities and the quality
of the environment. No published account is yet available
For published accounts of other successful mediation efforts else-
where, see M. Rivkin, Negotiated Development: A Breakthrough in Environ-
mental Controversies (1977); O'Connor, "Resolving the Bachmann's Warbler
Controversy," Conservation News (August 1, 1977); "Mediation: A Less
Costly Alternative to Litigation," National Wildlife Federation, Resour-
ces Defense Column (January 12, 1978); Where We Agree: The Report of the
National Coal Policy Project (1978); O'Connor, supra note 6; Environmen-
tal Mediation, supra note 5, at 35-46.
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disputes over a period of three years, he concluded that only six of them
were "mediable".6 1
While mediation or negotiation of environmental disputes is certainly
not the magical answer to environmental conflict -- and, more importantly,
no guarantee of a "good" decision -- our experience with the process to
date suggests that it is a useful approach. In this chapter I examine the
advantages of government agency participation in bargaining processes.
After sketching the different roles an agency may play regarding an environ-
mental dispute, and discussing the pros and cons of participation, I iden-
tify some of the special problems of environmental dispute resolution --
by contrasting bargaining in environmental and labor disputes -- and show
how the participation of government agencies may mitigate some of these
difficulties.
. Differing Roles for Agencies -- How Government is Involved
The word "government" needs some definition for my purposes in this
thesis. I will use "government" to identify the general institutions which
legitimately exercise authority on behalf of the public: the Congress,
state legislatures, federal and state courts, the President, governors,
etc. I will use "agency" to identify those federal and state regulatory
or administrative bodies, created by statute, which often have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of environmental disputes. For examples, such
agencies would include the EPA, NRCand the various state environmental
protection agencies among others.
An agency will typically be involved in an environmental dispute
6 1
See Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 17.
- 31 -
in at least one of three ways. Most- generally, an agency may find itself
an "interested party" to the dispute; lacking statutory jurisdiction over
the matter in dispute, it nonetheless might recognize that the dispute con-
tains elements that are of concern, or the agency may be the governmental
body most familiar with the dispute and thus in the best position to repre-
sent the interests of the general public. One example of an agency as
"interested party" is the recently completed work of the National Coal Pol-
icy Project.62 The Project brought together representatives of environ-
mental groups and industry, then, with the assistance of technical advi-
sors, the groups attempted to reach consensus on the varied issues compre-
hended by a national policy regarding development and use of our coal re-
serves. The Project report envisioned an active role for the EPA in future
decision-making regarding coal development.63 Here, absent any statutory
authority to participate in a private mediation effort considering a pro-
posed national policy, the EPA might choose to participate as an "inter-
ested party," providing the private parties with some notion of the feasi-
bility of their recommendations.
Another role that agencies play is that of "prosecutor." In Chapter
Three, the case study of PCB pollution of the Hudson River shows an agency,
the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, conducting an en-
forcement action against the General Electric Company; i.e., the agency
was prosecuting the company for a violation of the agency's regulations.
In such cases, the agency, by participating in an informal bargaining ef-
fort, may be able to fashion a remedy that is particularly adapted to the
62
See Where We Agree, supra note 60.
Id. at iv.
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violation in question and, in addition, achieve a settlement in much less
time than the formal process would have required.
Agencies also act as a "judge", and, in fact, will often be both
judge and prosecutor; the agency both brings the enforcement action and
conducts the hearings which establish liability. The best examples of
agency as judge are perhaps the licensing and permitting activities of the
EPA and other federal agencies. In such processes, an applicant seeking
a permit is judged by the agency and, if found acceptable, receives his
permit.
An agency will become involved in a mediation or negotiation effort
in one or more of these ways. The important distinction among them is that
in the latter two, prosecutor and judge, the agency has been granted juris-
diction over the subject matter of the dispute by statute. Thus, no mat-
ter what agreement is reached by the private parties to the dispute, the
agency will ultimately have the power to accept or rej,ect the settlement.6 4
Where the agency is an interested party, however, it will not have this
grant of statutory authority to decide the fate of the settlement.
Incentive for Agency Participation
A crucial threshhold question in this inquiry is whether an agency
would choose to initiate or otherwise become involved in an environmental
mediation or negotiation effort. As we see in the following chapter,6 5
agencies, in the past, have chosen to participate. But are these cases
6 4Agency jurisdiction is most critical in the area of implementa-
tion. See pp- 36-40 infra.
65See PP'51-71 infra.
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merely isolated and singular instances or may we expect other agencies, in
different circumstances, to participate as well?
Certainly, there are reasons not to. Because negotiation and media-
tion are ad hoc, informal processes oucside the scope of normal agency pro-
cedures, the agency that participates in a bargaining effort may lay itself
open to charges that it is exceeding its legitimate authority. Critics
may claim that the agency is shirking its duty -- particularly when it is
acting as prosecutor -- and, rather than attempting to make "deals" with
those who violate environmental laws, should be seeking to enforce the law
in the manner officially prescribed. Further, the agency may risk char-
ges that a bargaining effort shows that it has been "captured" by the very
interests it is supposed to be regulating.6 6
Agency officials may also be hesitant about offending powerful,
elected officials who influence policy, control agency resources through
the budget process and suggest appointments. When an agency participates
in a large-scale bargaining effort involving numerous parties, its activi-
ties may be perceived by some elected officials as an intrusion on their
own political "turf": they may view such activities as just the sort of
political "log-rolling" which they believe to be their private bailiwick.
Agency officials may also be reluctant to participate in bargaining
because it involves a lessened role for themselves. Rather than being the
central figure in a formal process, with attendant media coverage throwing
a spotlight on agency personnel, the official finds himself engaged in
"behind-the-scenes" discussions where confidentiality, not publicity, is
6 6See Stewart, supra note 28, at 1685; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
Administrative Action (1965) at 11-14.
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the rule. Further, in a consensual process, the agency official neither
sits in judgment nor enforces the law (both positions of power and pres-
tige); instead, he becomes merely another actor in an often frustrating
and tedious process with no guarantee of success.
To make matters worse, even though the agency is only one party to
the bargaining process, because of its high "visibility" it risks being
held solely responsible for an unpopular agreement or blamed when settle-
ment efforts break down. An agency may also find it extremely difficult
to exit from bargaining sessions, no matter how reasonable the action
might be, without being accused of damaging the prospects for settlement.67
There are, of course, also advantages to participation. The major
advantage of mediation and negotiation as methods for dealing with regu-
latory problems is that they achieve consensus and voluntary compliance.
Agreement among all the affected parties minimizes the risks of extended
conflict, potentially adverse publicity, and severe drain on agency re-
sources that often arise out of the adversary mode of formal regulatory
processes.68 Voluntary compliance with agency rules also makes the agency
look reasonable and creates a strong impression of competency and capable
leadership.
Bargaining also makes it easier to tailor different settlements to
the special needs presented by an individual case and thus both encourages
voluntary compliance (the regulatee gets a "'better deal" through bargain-
ing than was possible through the formal process) and makes for better
6 7See Susskind and Weinstein, "Towards a Theory of Environmental Dis-
pute Resolution," unpublished draft, MIT (1979).
6 8See Breyer, "Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Re-
strictive Alternatives and Reform," 92 Harv. L. Rev. 552, 582-83 (1979);
see also Stewart, supra note 28, at 1772.
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solutions -- the "tailored" settlement, not being bound to the more re-
stricted and less flexible procedures of the formal process, has the poten-
tial for an innovative or localized solution that benefits both the general
public and the regulatee more than a traditional approach.
In any given case, the agency faced with the choice of participating
in environmental conflict resolution outside normal agency channels would
weigh the potential benefits and risks and make its decision. The poten-
tial benefits from a successful mediation or negotiation process -- par-
ticularly the avoidance of extended and expensive conflict -- seem to be
adequate to convince agencies, at least at times, that participation is
the appropriate choice.
Special Problems in Environmental Dispute Resolution
In the Introduction, I noted that there were some special problems
with environmental dispute resolution. These problems can be highlighted
by contrasting environmental disputes and their resolution with collective
bargaining in labor disputes, long a model for conflict management using
consensual agreements. In this section, I identify three problems that I
consider to be significant -- implementation of agreements, the nature of
environmental disputes, and the notion of the public interest -- and indi-
cate how the participation of government agencies in the bargaining pro-
cess may begin to address them and thus facilitate environmental dispute
resolution.
Similarities
Before noting the many differences between bargaining in environ-
- 36 -
mental and labor disputes, it is important to consider what elements they
share. If there is not a significant overlap between these two cases, it
is futile to contrast their differences.
In both cases, mediation involves the use of third-party intervenors
who work from an impartial base. The neutrality and impartiality of the
mediator is critical whether it is a labor or environmental dispute. In
both cases, the parties must be willing to agree that their goal is to
reach a decision through compromise; they should not view bargaining as a
"stalling" tactic that will enable therm to hold out for an extreme posi-
tion, or agree to a settlement which they know to be unworkable. The
parties must also stand in some relative balance of power. There can be
no meaningful bargaining or compromise if one party has nothing to trade. 6 9
Whether it be an environmental or labor dispute, bargaining efforts re-
quire and share these common elements: a neutral mediator, parties with
something to trade and a willingness to bargain, and a commitment to reach-
ing a decision through compromise. But despite these shared preconditions
to bargaining, there are striking and substantial differences that make
environmental dispute resolution a much more difficult process.
Implementation
As was stated in the Introduction, implementation of collective bar-
gaining agreements is rarely a problem. There are numerous reasons for
this: first, the parties have entered a well-understood contractual rela-
tionship whose terms are clear both to the parties and to the court or
6 9 See Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 18-19.
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administrative agency -- usually the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
-- which may be called on to interpret it; second, collective bargaining
is repeated in regular cycles, making it difficult for either party to
flout an agreement since that will only make the next round of bargaining
more onerous and, therefore, likely to be much more costly to both sides;
third, and most important, both labor and management are aware that if im-
plementation does not occur, the result, a renewed strike or other "work
action," will be costly for both. 7 0
With environmental disputes, implementation is much trickier. Agree-
ments in environmental disputes are novel, courts and agencies are unfamil-
iar with their terms and may interpret them in ways unforeseen by the par-
ties in the event of a question in their implementation. Because the par-
ties to environmental disputes are less readily identifiable than the
representatives of labor and management, there is always the possibility
that an agreement will be challenged -- and its implementation frustrated
-- by an individual or group not included in the process. Also, because
environmental groups are less cohesive than labor unions, a group that was
involved in a settlement effort may fragment over a proposed agreement,
with the newly-created "splinter group" now attempting to halt implementa-
tion of the parent group's bargain.
In collective bargaining, moreover, once the principal parties have
agreed to the terms of a settlement there is ordinarily no question that
the parties have the ability to implement it. Although in rare cases an
agreement may be frustrated by government -- for example, because it vio-
70 .
Se pp. 43-46 infra.
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lates wage guidelines or labor laws -- or, more frequently, rejected by the
union rank and file, in the vast majority of labor disputes, the settlement
achieved through collective bargaining (both negotiation and mediation) is
implemented in due course.
In environmental disputes, on the other hand, whenever the subject
matter of a settlement is within the statutory jurisdiction of a government
agency, the parties to that settlement are wholly without authority to im-
plement their agreement. For example, even if local residents, environ-
mentalists, and businessmen have negotiated a settlement of a siting dis-
pute involving a new industrial plant, various government agencies may
have jurisdiction over the location of the plant (local zoning boards and
planning agencies); its mode of operation (a state air quality control
board); or disposal of industrial by-products (EPA regulation of hazardous
wastes). If these agencies have not been parties to the bargaining pro-
cess and settlement, they may find that they cannot both honor the volun-
tary settlement and fulfill their statutory mandate; in such cases the
agency, by denying or qualifying necessary permits and licenses, or initi-
ating enforcement actions, may frustrate implementation of the private
settlement.
Clearly, then, in the wide range of environmental disputes where
agency jurisdiction is likely to be invoked, the participation of the
agency in the bargaining process and settlement will make implementation
more certain since the agency controls the very means of implementation.
But government participation helps to insure implementation in other,
less obvious, ways as well.
Government participation fosters implementation by assisting in the
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identification of all affected parties and assuring that they participate
in the bargaining process.71 Agency requirements for public participation
in government decision-making, for example, provide government officials
with a model for, and experience with, including concerned parties in
agency procedures. That experience may be transferred from formal to in-
formal processes with little difficulty since the techniques for achieving
participation -- adequate notice and providing an opportunity to influence
decisions -- remain the same in both cases.
Since the government is likely to participate in a number of differ-
ent disputes over time, agency participation can foster implementation by
introducing an element of the cyclical nature of collective bargaining.
Parties may be reluctant to frustrate implementation of a consensual set-
tlement when they know that they - or others representing similar con-
cerns -- may have to deal with the same official or agency in the future.
Finally, government participation adds to the bargaining process a
party whose mandate is to serve the general public interest rather than
some particular set of values and concerns. In environmental disputes, it
is not unusual to find that all the parties identify their position with
the "public interest;"72 however, because each party really serves only
its own vision of the public good, an agreement, while satisfactory to the
bargaining parties, will not necessarily be concerned with more general,
or diffuse, concerns. While no one, including government, can truly claim
to know what will maximize the general welfare, the government is at least
7 1See pp. 42-43 infra.
72See Susskind and Weinstein, supra note 67; see also Stewart, supra
note 28, at 1764.
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pledged to attempt to work towards the well-being of the whole society.
Government participation can thus aid implementation by providing the
public with some assurance that an agreement will serve general, as well
as particular, interests. 7 3
I have argued that the most important contribution that government
agencies can bring to environmental dispute resolution efforts is their
ability to offer the parties a significant likelihood that a settlement
will be implemented. Clearly, where a government agency will have juris-
diction as "prosecutor" or "judge", its participation in the bargaining
process and agreement with the terms of the settlement greatly simplifies
implementation. Problems, of course, will still remain. A "splinter
group" may challenge the agency action that implements the settlement,
and it is possible that a reviewing court would rule in their favor. Still,
it seems unlikely that a court would often overturn a settlement supported
by both the negotiating parties (representing opposing sides of the dis-
pute) and the government agency. And, further, if the agreement were over-
turned, it may well be for a good reason. Remember, bargaining is not a
magical process that guarantees correct outcomes.
The Nature of the Dispute
In a labor dispute, what is at issue is quite clear. Contract terms
such as wages, fringe benefits, and work conditions are a common vocabulary
shared by the parties. Further, the parties are usually comfortable with -
73Se pp.-47-50 infra.
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comparing competing offers in dollar terms. Such a ready translation
of mutually understood terms into an easily comparable currency is not
possible in environmental disputes.75 These disagreements are exacerbated
by the scientific content of many environmental disputes. Where scien-
tific judgments enter a dispute, there is an unfortunate tendency for value
statements and fact statements to become confused. This clouds the de-
bate in two ways: first, there is insufficient recognition that few "fact"
statements are ever value-free; and second, there is a tendency to defer
to scientific judgment to sort out the technical issues and make the "right"
decision. Working together, these factors obscure discussion in allied,
yet opposite, ways. The discussion focuses on science -- when the more
critical questions may be those of values. And, at the same time, value
judgments are confused with statements of scientific fact. 7 7
74When serious disagreement about issues does arise, it is often be-
cause the issue in question is not readily translated into dollars: for
example, the role of the worker in controlling his work schedule or the
introduction of innovative production processes designed to make factory
work less tedious and dehumanizing.
7 5 Thus, for example, while all parties to an environmental dispute
might be able to agree that a proposed plant will emit "x" pounds of oxides
of nitrogen per day, there would likely be sharp debate about whether "x"
pounds is acceptable. Further, if it were shown that one of the "costs"
of "x" pounds of emissions is an increase in human morbidity or mortality,
comparison of costs on dollar terms would become morally and philosophical-
ly repugnant to many environmentalists; and, the reluctance to compare in
terms of dollars alone may extend to almost any type of nonpecuniary envi-
ronmental impact.
7 6See L. Tribe et al., When Values Conflict (1976); D. Passmore,
Man's Responsibility for Nature (1974).
7 7 See E. Ashby, Reconciling Man with the Environment (1978). Ashby
points out that while it is for the scientists to say whether there is a
hazard to the environment and what its causes are, it is for administra-
tors and politicians to decide what to do about the alleged hazard. Id.
at 30.
IN
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Environmental disputes are also marked by disagreements about the
"boundaries" of the dispute, only a slight problem in labor negotiations.
In collective bargaining, the limits of the dispute are clear, or can be
readily estimated. Thus, the disputants are known,78 it is clear that the
settlement will include only those parties, and there is little question
as to the effects of the settlement.79 In an environmental dispute, there
may be disagreement as to geographical boundaries, affected parties, and
the relevant time horizon needed to fashion a settlement.
Such disagreements over "boundaries" can arise in at least two ways.
There may be disagreements as to the physical characteristics of the mat-
ters in dispute. Thus, for example, there may be differing views of what
constitutes the natural ecological boundaries of an affected site or sys-
tem, or the extent to which "spillover" effects will occur.80 Disagree-
78The National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), as amen-
ded] provides a system for determining the size ("boundary") of the union
bargaining unit in a labor dispute. Section 9b of the Act [29 U.S.C. §
159b (1976)] permits the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to "decide
in each case" whether the "appropriate unit for purposes-of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivi-
sion thereof." Thus, for example, the NLRB could decide whether the ap-
propriate bargaining unit for a union in the automobile industry was: (1)
all the workers at G.M., (2) all the machinists in the industry; (3) the
workers at Ford's River Rouge plant; or (4) the workers in the Parts sec-
tion of that plant. See generally, R. Gorman, Labor Law (1976) at 66-92.
79The major area of uncertainty, typically, is the contract's ef-
fect on future employment, i.e., will the settlement be so costly as to
curb the company's growth or create incentives towards moving, increased
automation, etc.?
80
There may also be disagreements as to the proper time horizons
for measurement. For example, a major issue in the dispute over a pro-
posed co-generation facility in Boston (which called for the use of diesel
generators) was the proper time period for the measurement of nitrous
oxide emissions. Opponents of the facility were concerned about possible
harmful concentrations of only an hour's duration, while the developer was
seeking a standard based on average concentrations over a much longer period.
See Friedman and Kendall, "Citizen Participation in the Energy Facility
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ments may also arise because there 'is not an easy "match" between the
acknowledged boundaries of impacts and the jurisdiction of the political
units charged with decision-making about such impacts. In this situation,
it may prove difficult to find a workable boundary for either limiting
entry into the negotiating process or creating an effective mechanism to
implement a settlement.
Another arguable difference between environmental and labor disputes
is the nature of their costs. In a labor dispute, the costs of conflict
are borne by both contending parties. A strike prevents the employer from
earning a profit and the employee from earning a wage. Further, it is not
always the employer who can absorb the costs of disagreement more readily.
When a strike occurs at the start of a retail merchant's "busy season," or
when a manufacturer has a depleted inventory, it may be the employer, not
the worker, who will be damaged more by the action. The important things
to note are that each side has the ability to inflict costs on the other,
but by doing so, must also absorb some -- perhaps even more -- costs him-
self, and, that there may be costs to a bad agreement as well as a strike.
If an exorbitant wage agreement prices a company's products out of the
market, both sides suffer; the company loses business and some workers
lose their jobs. In an extreme case, of course, the company fails and
both workers and employers suffer an extremely high cost for a "bad" set-
tlement or a prolonged strike.
This symmetry in the costs of disagreement -- or a "bad" agreement
-- in labor disputes is almost wholly missing from environmental disputes.
Siting Process: A Case Study of the Medical Area Total Energy Plant
(MATEP)," Energy Impacts Project, Technical Report No. 17, Laboratory of
Architecture and Planning, MIT (1979).
- *W-'
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For the relatively minor costs of litigation expenses, an environmental
group can inflict millions of dollars in added interest charges and other
costs of delay on a developer. On the other hand, the victorious develop-
er will proceed with his project, inflicting real (if impossible to quan-
tify in dollar terms) costs on the environmentalists who see the things
they value -- cleaner air and water, a more "natural" use of land, less
radioactive material, etc. -- endangered. Thus, instead of symmetrical
costs, as is the case with labor disputes, the costs of environmental con-
flict are skewed in two ways. First, environmentalists can initiate con-
flict at relatively minor cost to themselves -- contrast this with the
costs of a strike action which are borne somewhat equally by both parties.
Second, developers do not attach the same value to the costs of environ-
mental "change" as do environmentalists, thus, it is environmentalists
alone who bear the brunt of costs -- in environmental degradation -- cre-
ated by a "bad" settlement, i.e., one that provides insufficient protection
for things they value. Working together, these two asymmetries in costs
tend to make environmental conflict more prevalent and more intense because
conflict costs little to initiate and the costs of defeat are borne almost
entirely by the losing party.
One last, critical, difference in the nature of the costs of labor
and environmental disputes is the notion of irreversible effects. In col-
lective bargaining, a disastrous strike -- or settlement -- may drive a
company into bankruptcy, induce it to leave the state or country, or have
devastating impacts on the financial and personal lives of workers, but
few of these effects are truly irreversible. Bankrupt firms are reorgan-
ized or sold and production continues, Massachusetts loses jobs but Georgia
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gains them, and workers are retrained for new job opportunities. Further,
most changes that occur are at least theoretically reversible -- allowing
for the linearity of time -- so that if one had the desire to move a cotton
goods factory back to Lowell, Massachusetts it would only be a question of
the necessary means.
An environmental dispute, on the other hand, may involve truly irre-
versible effects such as species extinction. No means exist to fulfill the
desire to see the passenger pigeon, extinct for over 65 years, fly again
in its millions. There is a growing acknowledgement that actions which
are massive enough, drastic enough, or simply of the right sort will cause
environmental changes which are irreversible.81 And such irreversible ef-
fects are often unpredictable. When human interference with the natural
environment becomes too great, it can result in an environment no longer
appropriate for a complex ecosystem. Such "simplified" environments --
which almost inevitably result from human activities -- tend to be highly
unstable, and additional interventions (for example, pest control on land
recently cleared for farming) tend to be inherently destabilizing. The
result is environmental change that cannot be reversed.82 The fact that
profoundly irreversible effects may occur, and that many are unpredict-
able, is a cost unique to environmental disputes, and one that environmen-
81
See W. Murdock (ed.), Environment: Resources, Pollution and
Society (1972), 18-26.
82
See Murdock, supra. The author notes, for example: "Typically,
when tropical forests are removed and the soil exposed [this process is
occurring today in Brazil's Amazon region], the mineral nutrients (al-
ready poor) are leached by the rain. The soil usually becomes hardened
and thereafter the forest will not grow back again, nor can crops be
grown. Such irreversible changes will almost always produce a simplifi-
cation of the environment. Id.
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talists will almost always seek to prevent.
The participation of government in the bargaining process can ad-
dress some of the problems raised by the special nature of environmental
disputes. Regulatory agencies, in particular, can provide resources and
expertise that will aid in addressing and clarifying the difficult factual
disputes that mark environmental conflicts. Funding for environmental dis-
pute resolution efforts, a significant problem in the past,83 may also be
less difficult if agency resources are available. In many cases, agency
personnel may be able to provide information and advice which would other-
wise have to be contracted for at great expense. Agencies can also be
helpful with "boundary" questions since they operate on a state and federal
level and can transcend the limitations on decision-making faced by local,
private parties.
In many ways, of course, government participation would have little
impact on the problematic nature of environmental conflict. Where environ-
mental disputes are marked by extreme ideological stances it is unlikely
that government -- or, for that matter, bargaining -- could convince the
contending parties to acknowledge the legitimacy of one another's views.
Further, government officials are not immune to confusing factual with
value-laden statements. Although their relative objectivity may be helpful
in recognizing particularly egregious instances of fact-value confusion,
they cannot provide value-neutral technical counsel, the problem will per-
sist despite government participation.8 4
8 3See Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 21-25.
8 4See Jaffe, supra note 66, at 25.
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Environmental mediation, however, is neither a magical answer to
all environmental conflict, nor a guarantee of correct outcomes; but
where the contending parties have shown a willingness to talk, government
participation may prove helpful. In particular, government can bring to
bear resources, otherwise unavailable, that will illuminate factual con-
cerns and can provide a mechanism for enlarging the boundaries of deci-
sion-making and implementation.
Serving the "Public Interest" -- Questions of Representation and Legitimacy
Another unique aspect of environmental disputes is that advocates of
one position or another claim that they represent not just their own con-
cerns but the "public interest" as well.85 By identifying symbolically
with the public interest, each advocate hopes to discourage political at-
tack and to win popular support. Unfortunately, this tends to confuse and
complicate, rather than illuminate debate.86 While environmentalists may
8 5 Despite the long and serious debate in the social policy disci-
plines, most scholars would probably agree with the recent observation
that "It may be impossible to determine whether the public irterest has
been satisfactorily defined, let alone when it has been achieved." See
DiMento, "Citizen Environmental Litigation and the Administrative Process:
Empirical Findings, Remaining Issues and a Direction for Future Research,"
1977, Duke L.J. 409, 441 (1977). For most public policy analysts, the
search for a unitary public interest has long been recognized as futile.
Particular decisions may be viewed as "optimal" because they benefit al-
most everyone and hurt no one, but policy outcomes cannot in and of them-
selves be judged as "in the public interest." There are too many dimensions
along which different segments of the population must evaluate an outcome.
Different populations are likely to have different time horizons, risk
orientations, and different values. See Susskind and Weinstein, supra
note 67.
8 6The following statement illustrates the problem: ". . .the courts
need to recognize that whereas governmental agencies are the representatives
of the 'economic' interests, the conservation groups are more apt to repre-
sent the 'public interest'." See Tremaine, "Standing in the Federal Courts
for Conservation Groups," 6 Urban Law. 116, 136-37 (1972).
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feel that they represent the public interest because environmental protec-
tion is in "everyone's best interest," a decision-maker facing a difficult
environment-development trade-off must balance a great many factors. Once
a policy position is cast in terms of support for the public interest,
rather than in terms of balancing or accommodating the varied interests of
various publics, compromise becomes difficult.8 7
Professor Stewart has noted another set of problems, regarding the
legitimacy of "public interest" advocates. Stewart questions "whether a
public interest advocate truly represents the interest for which he pur-
ports to speak and, ultimately, how that interest is to be defined,"8 8
noting that the advocate is often a lawyer who is "not subject to any
mechanism of accountability to ensure his loyalty to the scattered indivi-
duals whose interests he purports to represent."89 Stewart fears that,
particularly in the context of settlements,90 "the lawyer will not advo-
8 7This problem has been addressed by a group organized by the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences. They note: ". . .with regard to environ-
mental disputes, value conflicts may have been submerged in the past because
of a nearly universal agreement that economic growth and efficiency were de-
sirable ends in themselves, or at least they were important in whatever
system of ends might be pursued. In today's much more fluid situation,
competing values, recognized by many as equally valid, are receiving wide-
spread support. The result is an inherent tension and moral ambiguity
about values -- a classic instance of Hegel's conflict of right against
right." See L. Tribe, C. Schelling, J. Voss, When Values Conflict (1976)
at xi-xii; see also Marcus, supra note 3, at 582, n.l.
8 8 Stewart, supra note 28, at 1764; see generally, Id., at 1762-70.
_., at 1765.
9 0 Id. Stewart notes that "[w]henever representation is undertaken on
behalf of an unorganized class, there is a danger that settlements will be
reached simply to get the lawyer a fee." See Id., at 1743, n. 354.
To~
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cate the interests of the broad constituency supposedly represented, but
rather his own interests or those of a few active members of that consti-
tuency."91 Further, in Stewart's view, these problems are only partially
alleviated where it is an organization, rather than scattered individuals
who are being represented. He notes that, although -the lawyer will pre-
sumably be responsive to the organization's leadership and the leadership
is presumed to be responsive to the membership, "often such organizations
purport to represent, and are perceived as representing, a far broader
class of individuals than their own members." 92
The "public interest" problem thus has two aspects. First, when one
side sees itself as the only legitimate representative of the "public in-
terest", accommodation becomes difficult. Second, there are real questions
as to whether "public interest" advocates can legitimately be said to repre-
sent the public.
The participation of government agencies in bargaining may help to
address the second problem. Because environmental dispute processes are
novel, new rules can be fashioned to guide the participants. A government
agency, before agreeing to participate in bargaining, might seek to evalu-
ate the adequacy and fidelity of organizational advocates -- in a manner
similar to that used by the federal courts in class actions -- and make
its participation contingent on an advocate's meeting some threshhold stan-
9 1Id at 1765-66. See also Id., at 1766, n. 460.
9 2Stewart, supra note 28, at 1767.
9 3See the discussion in Stewart, supra, at 1742-43.
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dard of accountability in representation.
The first problem is more persistent. In the most serious case,
where one side sees the conflict as one of right against wrong, bargaining
may well be impossible. In other instances, the presence of government
officials in the bargaining process may encourage the parties to take a
broader view of their dispute. When one party stresses the "rightness"
of its position, it may prove helpful if the agency, rather than the oppo-
site party, notes that there are valid and competing interests that are
opposed to the proferred position.
9 4 Such a policy was successfully adopted by Gerald Cormick in his
mediation of the Snoqualmie/Snohomish dispute. See note 60 supra.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CONTEXTS FOR AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION:
MODELS, PRECEDENTS AND PROSPECTS
Introduction
If, as I have argued, agency participation in environmental media-
tion can aid the process and provide significant benefits to the agency
itself, how might an agency participate in bargaining? In this chapter I
examine three contexts for agency participation: mediated settlement of
an enforcement action based on the consent order model; mediation of a
regulatory agency permitting or licensing process; and, the prospects for
mediation and other forms of conflict resolution created by the new NEPA
regulations. These three contexts for mediation correspond, respectively,
to the three roles played by government agencies -- prosecutor, judge, and
interested party -- that I defined in Chapter Two,95 thus illustrating that
bargaining may be an available choice for agency action in each of these
differing roles.
The first context, mediated settlement of an enforcement action,
looks to the model provided by the well-established process of settling
government enforcement proceedings through confidentially negotiated con-
sent orders. After sketching the operation of the consent order process
in two agencies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Justice Depart-
ment (Justice), I will present a case study of mediation of an enforcement
proceeding in the environmental field, and indicate the important differ-
ences between the two procedures.
9 5See supra at30-32
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To illustrate the second context for environmental dispute resolu-
tion, mediation of a permitting process, I have chosen a case study that
exhibits the procedures that agencies may use to combine mediation efforts
with more traditional regulatory processes.
Finally, I examine the new NEPA regulations and indicate how they
offer agencies an opportunity to assist potentially adversarial parties
in avoiding the "necessity" of conflict.
The Consent Order Model
In the American system of justice, the great majority of cases --
including complex civil litigation -- are disposed of by various means prior
to trial, i.e., the parties agree to a settlement rather than having a
settlement imposed by the court.96 Settlement is attractive, first, be-
cause it is much less costly in time, money and resources than litigation,
and second, because it promotes a result that is alligned with the parties'
real concerns.97 The bargaining of the settlement.process also helps the
parties to maximize the benefits they can obtain at the expense of others:
each side must set its own priorities and then trade off less important
elements for those of greater import. 9 8
9 6In the 12-month period ending June 30, 1977, no more than 16.3 per-
cent of the cases filed in federal courts reached trial. Some sample per-
centages by type of case are: Contract actions -- 8.4 percent; Private
anti-trust -- 11.8 percent; Government civil rights -- 10.2 percent. See
1977 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 189, 317-19, 332-34 (1978).
9 7See Renfrew, "Settling Commercial Litigation: The Role of the
Court," in Practicing Law Institute, Settling Complex Commercial Litiga-
tion (1978) at 72.
9 8See Breyer, supra note 68, at 582.
Aff
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Where litigation is complex, settlement has an additional benefit:
the litigants and their attorneys have far more -- and more accurate --
information concerning the facts of the case and, critically, the basis of
the real dispute, than they can communicate to the court or other trier
of fact. The communication problem is twofold: first, the court may need
to be educated in the operation of a business, understand the complexities
of a long-standing relationship, or comprehend a technical field in order
to decide the case; second, the procedures of the adversary process --
particularly the rules of evidence -- create a significant risk that cru-
cial background material will be disregarded in the decision-making pro-
cess.99 Lacking a full understanding of the information before it and
having excluded other, perhaps crucial, information on the basis of formal
rules, the court is in a poor position to render an equitable judgment
that acknowledges the real concerns of the parties. In such cases, set-
tlement may permit more innovative solutions and more equitable compro-
mises than the courts; accordingly, where some common ground is available
for settlement, the parties will often seek to avoid trial.
Government antitrust litigation -- the civil proceedings brought by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice -- is an example
of complex litigation in which settlement, rather than judgment, is the
preferred alternative.100 These settlements, known as consent decrees,
illustrate the advantages to both parties just noted above. The consent
decree is a much less costly alternative than litigation and is ordinarily
9 9See Renfrew, supra note 97.
1 0 0See T. Lindstrom and K. Tighe, 1 Antitrust Consent Decrees
(1974) at ix.
fw9
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a much speedier process as well. Further, consent decrees provide an
opportunity to minimize risk. No party is ever guaranteed of winning a
lawsuit; particularly when there is uncertainty as to the facts of the
case or the law is unclear, the consent order offers a known, and accep-
table, cost that is often an attractive alternative to risking a costly
defeat.101 Because of these benefits, the consent order process has been
used in 80 percent of the government antitrust actions brought since
1957.102
In essence, an antitrust consent decree is a contractual settlement
to litigation,103 distinguished primarily by the defendant's agreement to
comply with the terms of the settlement in exchange for a provision in the
consent order stating that the settlement implies no admission or deter-
mination that there has been a violation of the antitrust laws.104 The
other important attribute of the consent order process is that settlement
is achieved through confidential negotiations between the parties, a pro-
cedure that has never been expressly defined or authorized by statute.105
The success of the antitrust consent decree process at the Justice
101
See Kalodner, "Consent Decrees as an Antitrust Enforcement De-
vice," 23 Antitrust Bulletin 277, 284-85 (1978). In particular, a consent
decree avoids imposition of the treble damages portion of an antitrust
judgment. Id; see also infra, at
10 2See Lindstrom and Tighe, supra note 100.
1 0 3Note, however, that the consent order is treated by the courts
as a "judicial act" rather than a contract. See Lindstrom and Tighe,
supra note 100, at x.
1 0 4The corporate defendant wants to avoid an imposition of liability
because an adverse judgment in a suit brought by the government is prima
facie evidence of antitrust violations in a later private action for treble
damages. See Kaloder, supra note 101, at 285.
1 0 5 ee Lindstrom and Tighe, supra note 100, at ix.
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Department has led to its adoption in other regulatory settings. For
example, over the past fifteen years the consent order procedure has be-
come an increasingly significant factor in the FTC's handling of its case-
load in two ways. First, as the law under a particular statute adminis-
tered by the FTC becomes clearly established, the consent order procedure
provides a method of settlement of disputes that avoids the needless time
and cost of litigating settled matters of law. Second, where a case pre-
sents complicated questions of fact and law, the consent order has been
used to create a tailor-made solution that benefits the public and assures
the rights of the individual respondent to a far greater degree than could
be achieved under the more restricted and less flexible procedures govern-
ing formal FTC hearings and decisions. 1 0 6
As with the Justice Department's consent orders, FTC orders provide
that no admission or determination of a violation of trade regulation
statutes has occurred, and are also negotiated confidentially.1 0
7
I will now present a case study involving an enforcement action by
a state regulatory agency, where the consent order model was adopted to
negotiate a settlement between the parties. At the end of the narrative,
I'll contrast the differences between that settlement and those obtained
through consent orders.
106See T. Lindstrom and K. Tighe, Trade Regulation by Negotiation
(1974) at vii.
Id. at 1-2.
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The General Electric Ca-se
The General Electric case involved a suit against that company by
the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (Department)
which accused G.E. of violating state water quality standards by its dis-
charges of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's)108 into the upper Hudson
River.10 9
In 1973, G.E. had applied to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) for a permit allowing it to discharge PCB's, pursuant to the re-
quirements of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPD
110
ES). That permit was granted in December, 1974 -- allowing G.E. to
discharge an average of 30 pounds per day of PCB's -- but required that
discharges be reduced to less than one-quarter pound per day by May,
1977.11
In August, 1975, G.E.'s permit became a state Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (PDES) permit as the New York State Department of En-
vironmental Conservation took over administration of the program from
the EPA as provided under § 401 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA).ll2 The next month, September, the Department sued G.E. al-
1 0 8PCB's are a family of chlorinated hydrocarbons, which because of
their chemical and thermal stability are in wide industrial use. Although
first produced in 1929, their environmental and health hazards weren't ap-
preciated until the mid-1960s. See In Re General Electric Co., 6 ELR
30007, 30013-16 (N.Y. Department of Environmental Conservation, February 9,
1976) (hereafter cited as Interim Opinion).
1 0 9 See "Pounds of Cure: General Electric Agrees to PCB Abatement,
Cleanup and Research," 6 ELR 10225, 10226 (1976).
11033 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
illSee Interim Opinion, supra note 108, at 30012-13.
11233 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
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leging that the PCB discharges were harming fish and had damaged the com-
mercial and sport fishing industries on the Hudson. As a result, the
Department claimed, G.E.'s discharges violated applicable water quality
standards that prohibit impairment of fishing on the Hudson.1 1 3
Several groups sought to intervene as parties in the hearings sche-
duled on the suit: the New York Department of Commerce; the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council; the Hudson River Fishermen's Association; the
Hudson River Sloop Restoration; and the Federated Conservationists of
Westchester County. On November 19, 1975, the Department issued an opin-
ion allowing intervention by all the groups. 11 Later, a trade group, As-
sociated Industries of New York, Inc., also sought intervenor status, and
was admitted as a party in April, 1976.115
The hearings were held in the fall of 1975, Professor Abraham Sofaer
of Columbia University Law School serving as Hearing Officer. In his In-
terim Opinion, issued on February 9, 1976, Professor Sofaer found that
G.E. was liable for the damage to the fishing industry caused by the PCB
discharge,116 but noted that G.E. had been unaware of the dangers posed
by PCB's until recently and that both the Department and EPA had been slow
to respond to the problem.1 1 7
ll3See Interim Opinion, supra note 108, at 30007, 30012.
Id_., at 30007.
In Re General Electric Company (N.Y. Department of Environmental
Conservation, September 7 and 8, 1976), 6 ELR 30023 (1976) (hereafter
cited as Settlement Agreement).
1 1 6 See Interim Opinion, supra note 108, at 30007.
1 1 7Sofaer noted that there was "more than superficial appeal" to
G.E.'s affirmative defense that the grant of NPDES/PDES permits insulated
it from liability under state law. Id., at 30013. See also "Pounds of
Cure: . . . ," supra note 109, at 10226-27.
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The Department's initial demands on G.E. were quite severe. G.E.
was to halt PCB discharges immediately (abatement), undertake a complete
cleanup of the contamination it had caused (cleanup), and pay substantial
civil penalties. The company felt that these demands were unreasonable,
particularly the demand for total immediate abatement and the payment of a
penalty, and questioned whether the Department could compel reclamation of
the Hudson.1 1 8
Negotiations on the nature of the remedies for G.E.'s violations
thus began with the parties quite far apart. Because of the fairness that
Sofaer had shown in his opinion, the principal parties sought his aid in
achieving a settlement. Sofaer agreed to mediate if the following guide-
lines would be acceptable to both parties: Sofaer would perform no func-
tion as mediator that might tend to lessen his ability to decide the case
in the event the negotiation floundered or its results were challenged by
intervenors; all intervenors would be afforded a full opportunity to comment
informally on, and to challenge, any agreement worked out by the principal
parties; and that any proposed agreement would be presented to Sofaer for
review to determine whether its adoption would be recommended as in the
public interest. Intervenors were all promptly informed of the mediation
119
effort, and no objection was raised on their part.
1l8This was the first enforcement action of its kind in New York
history and only one of a handful of similar actions ever brought in any
state or federal court. It thus involved a number of legal questions that
had never been litigated, and many more that had not been definitely re-
solved. In particular, there was some doubt that G.E. could be required
to restore the Hudson. New York law contains no explicit authority for
ordering reclamation, except in special circumstances not applicable to
this case. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 115, at 30023, 24.
119Id., at 30023.
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After a number of serious negotiating sessions, the principal parties
agreed on the basic format for settlement. These terms were then communi-
cated to the environmental groups that had intervened and a meeting arranged
between the environmental representatives, their attorneys, Department at-
torneys and Sofaer. The agreement was fully discussed and questions were
raised that led to changes in the terms of the final settlement. After con-
sulting with their boards of directors, all the environmental groups agreed
to accept the negotiated settlement.1 2 0
Further negotiations then occurred between the principal parties to
work out the details of the agreement and, once again, the environmental
groups were consulted. Subsequently, all the other intervenors were in-
formed of the settlement and agreed that it should be accepted.1 2 1
Under the terms of the settlement, the Department agreed to drop its
claims for civil penalties and for immediate total abatement. In return,
G.E. agreed to spend $3 million on treatment facilities and to phase out
PCB use entirely by July 1, 1977. The Department further agreed to drop
its demand that G.E. completely clean up the PCB's that it had discharged
into the Hudson. In exchange, G.E. agreed to contribute an additional
$3 million to a cleanup program for PCB's, or if that were impractical,
for other substances chosen by the Department. In addition, G.E. pledged
to spend $1 million on research on PCB cleanup and on the environmental
effects of proposed PCB substitutes. Finally, the Department committed
122
itself to match G.E.'s $3 million contribution to a PCB cleanup program.
12 0 Settlement Agreement, supra note 115, at 30023.
121 Id.
122 Id., at 30024.
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There are a number of similarities between this mediated settlement
and the consent order process. Negotiations took place because both par-
ties acknowledged the legal uncertainties in the case and desired to avoid
a costly and time-consuming process of judicial review, both factors that
figure greatly in consent orders. Further, as is often the case with FTC
123
consent orders, General Electric's conduct had been essentially inno-
cent and it objected strenuously to having a judgment imposed that would
be a determination of liability.124 Finally, the mediated settlement was
innovative and equitable, freeing the parties from the rigid demands of
formal processes in a manner identical to the consent order.
The major distinction between this case and the traditional consent
order is quite crucial: the role played by the intervenors in the case.
Here, as had been agreed, when the preliminary negotiations resulted in a
basic format for settlement, Professor Sofaer communicated the terms to
the intervenors and they were afforded an opportunity to question and com-
ment on the proposed settlement. As negotiations continued, the environ-
mental intervenors in particular were kept informed of the state of the
bargaining sessions and consulted for their opinion. This notion of in-
cluding intervenors or, more generally, interested and affected third
parties in the settlement process is the crucial alteration of the consent
order model for the particular needs of environmental dispute resolution
efforts.
See Lindstrom and Tighe, supra note 106, at vii.
1 2 4Although it had polluted the Hudson, for nearly 45 years G.E.
had been unaware of the hazards that PCB's posed, and, until September,
1975, both state and federal authorities had permitted the PCB discharges.
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Consent orders have not ordinarily involved third parties because
the public is much less active in antitrust and trade regulation than in
enforcement of environmental regulations.125 In the case of environmental
mediation, 1 2 6 however, to maintain the consensual decision-making concept
that lies at the heart of the process requires that settlement of an en-
forcement action involve intervenors as well as the regulator and regula-
tee. Of course, agencies may settle an enforcement action without invol-
ving intervenors, but that would not be a consensual agreement to resolve
environmental conflict as defined in this thesis and would certainly les-
sen the probability that a settlement would go unchallenged.
"Separate but Parallel Tracks" for Agency Action -- The Brayton Point Case
Brayton Point Station is an electric generating plant whose four
units deliver 1600 MWe to New England. The plant is located in Somerset,
Massachusetts; nearby is the city of Fall River and Narragansett Bay. In
June, 1977, New England Power Company (NEPCO), which operates the plant,
received notice from the Department of Energy (DOE) that it intended to
prohibit the burning of oil in three of the units at Brayton Point and re-
quire that NEPCO convert those units to burn coal instead.127 DOE was
1250f course, this is not always the case; in particular, consumer
activists have been involved in FTC consent orders regarding media adver-
tising directed at young children.
It is also important to note the crucial role in this settlement
played by Professor Sofaer. In many ways, Sofaer's role resembled that of
a federal judge attempting to achieve settlement of a case before trial.
See Renfrew, supra note 97, at 72-76.
1 2 7See Conversion to Coal at Brayton Point (Final Report to the New
England Energy Task Force, presented by The Work Group on Conversion to
Coal at Brayton Point) (October, 1978) 19 (hereafter cited as Brayton
Point).
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acting under authority granted by the Energy Supply and Environmental Co-
ordination Act of 1974 (ESECA),128 which Congress had passed in response
to the oil embargo of 1973-1974.129
DOE estimated that conversion of Brayton Point to coal would lead to
an annual increase of more than $6 million in NEPCO's net cost for producing
electricity. The additional cost would be due largely to the expense in-
volved in meeting the necessary standards for compliance with air pollution
controls. To comply with the emission limits of the State Implementation
Plan (SIP) under the Clean Air Act, NEPCO would have to burn expensive low
sulfur coal and would likely have to install flue gas desulfurization
equipment ("scrubbers").130
NEPCO challenged the DOE estimates. It estimated that the cost of
conversion would be much greater than anticipated and was particularly op-
posed to any conversion plan that would require the use of "scrubbers". 1 3 1
NEPCO announced that it was prepared to contest the DOE Prohibition Order
in court.132 For NEPCO, the DOE Prohibition Order created a serious prob-
lem: to comply, it would have to burn coal at the plant but make sure
1 2 8Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 792 (1976).
1 2 9The Act required the Federal Energy Administration (now DOE) to
identify those power plants with the greatest potential for conversion to
coal. Brayton Point was one of five New England power plants identified
by DOE, and was by far the largest: as much oil would be saved by conver-
sion of Brayton Point as by the four other plants put together. See Bray-
ton Point, supra note 127, at 18.
1 3 0See Brayton Point, supra note 127, at 20.
1 3 1 NEPCO estimated that installation of "scrubbers" would cost $153.8
million (in 1975 dollars). Id.
132 id.
C
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that the emissions did not violate either state or federal air quality
standards, yet at the same time it would be trying to avoid a significant
increase in the cost of electricity or reduction in the efficiency of the
plant. 1 3 3
The Prohibition Order process is quite complex. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) must certify that a converting plant can meet ap-
plicable emission limits and protect both primary and secondary air qual-
ity standards while burning coal. DOE must prepare a comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) and also certify that conversion is eco-
nomically practicable. The Governor of the state, here Massachusetts,
must give his prior written concurrence before the Prohibition Order goes
into effect; that concurrence is then included in the Notice of Effective-
ness issued by DOE which completes the process.134 Thus, the ESECA pro-
gram was not merely complex, but it divided regulatory responsibilities
among a number of state and federal agencies and had no established mech-
anisms for resolving conflict.135
It appeared that the prospects for conversion of Brayton Point in a
manner that would satisfy all concerned parties, NEPCO, the regulatory
agencies, and energy consumers, were very poor. The ESECA program was new
and unclear, and its relationship with other regulatory programs, parti-
1 3 3 Brayton Point, supra note 127, at 20; see also Id., at 22-23.
4I., at 20.
135In this case, the situation was made even more complex because
of the contradictory nature of Massachusetts regulations contained in the
State Implementation Plan that permitted some large power plants to burn
cheap, high sulfur content oil. Id., at 21-24.
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cularly those concerned with air pollution, often appeared contradictory.
Further, the principal parties were uncertain of one another's motives for
opposing or promoting conversion and were apparently becoming so mired in
the legal and technical complexities of the process that they were unable
to approach the possibility of conversion in a constructive manner that
would encourage progress rather than stalemate.1 3 7
At this point, the Center for Energy Policy, a non-profit organiza-
tion concerned with the resolution of energy and environmental disputes,
suggested to the principal parties that they enlist the services of a
mediator in an effort to achieve a consensus as to how conversion would be
accomplished.138 In April, 1977, the Center for Energy Policy organized
a meeting attended by officials of NEPCO, DOE, EPA and the Massachusetts
Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) to examine the
prospects for conversion. The meeting was pivotal, producing a number of
crucial agreements on how to proceed towards conversion. NEPCO agreed
that the addition of some new equipment to control particulate emissions1 3 9
might be required to make conversion environmentally practical. Regula-
tory agency officials agreed that economic considerations might preclude
the use of "scrubbers" or low sulfur coal. 1 4 0
DOE agreed to participate in the mediation process, but also made
clear that it would continue to pursue conversion through the ESECA pro-
1 36Brayton Point, supra note 127.
137
.Id at 40.
1 3 8 See Id., at 43.
1 3 9 Electrostatic precipitators.
14 0See Brayton Point, supra note 127, at 27.
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cess; DOE had thus introduced the notion of "separate but parallel
tracks." While continuing with the formal conversion process -- issuance
of a Prohibition Order, preparation of an EIS, and cooperation with the
EPA in obtaining certification under the SIP -- Doe would also participate
in and cooperate with the mediation effort that was attempting to arrange
.141
a voluntary conversion.
As an illustration of how this notion of "separate but parallel
tracks" operated, DOE, in addition to preparing an EIS which examined con-
version under the plans generated by the formal process, prepared a second
EIS which examined conversion under the revised plan being considered in
the mediation process. Further, DOE encouraged the EPA to analyze the
prospects for certification under each of the plans being considered: the
formal process and the mediation effort. Thus, both agencies were able
to fulfill their statutory responsibilities while still cooperating with
and supporting the mediation effort that was working towards a voluntary
.142
conversion.
A period of long and arduous negotiation followed, but by March,
1978, an agreement had been reached on all issues. Under the agreement,
NEPCO will install additional pollution control equipment which will re-
duce its emissions of particulate matter. The Massachusetts DEQE will pro-
mulgate a new regulation for the control of air pollution from Brayton
Point which will set sulfur and particulate emission limits for at least
ten years.143 Thus, the essence of the plan is to achieve certainty as to
1 4 1Brayton Point, supra note 127.
142 ad.
13Id., at 8.
, 1w,
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both the emissions from the plant ahd the economic effect of the regula-
tions under which conversion will take place. The agreement expressly pro-
vided that mediation will be considered as a means to resolve any future
disputes over conversion to coal at the plant.1 4 4
The most interesting aspect of this case history is the introduction
of the notion of "separate but parallel tracks" for agency action. DOE
was able to recognize the clear advantages to be gained by a voluntary con-
version, and was eager to participate in the mediation process that could
achieve it. At the same time, both DOE and EPA officials were concerned
about fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities as 'judge" under the
ESECA process. DOE was able to see that there was nothing inherently
contradictory about pursuing both paths towards conversion simultaneously.
Even more important, both DOE and EPA took the necessary action -- prepar-
ation of an alternative EIS and SIP certification -- to assure that they
could promptly fulfill their regulatory responsibility were the mediation
effort successful. This model for agency participation in environmental
mediation efforts appears to be extremely promising. It insulates the
agency from charges that it is shirking its duty, yet permits cooperation
with less formal processes that could provide an agreement that is both
voluntary and innovative.
Another interesting aspect of both the Brayton Point and PCB cases
is that each involved an action that was initiated by the agency, rather
than by a developer or environmental group. Is there any reason to be-
lieve that environmental dispute resolution may be more difficult where
1 4 4Brayton Point, supra note 127.
1W
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the agency plays a less active role? I think so. At times there are
distinct advantages to environmental opponents using formal proceedings.
First, new groups may want to use a formal process to create credibility
for themselves, i.e., to show developers that they have the resources and
expertise to inflict costs on an opponent through litigation and delay.
Such credibility, in fact, may be a required condition precedent to parti-
cipation in informal processes.145 Second, even older groups may seek to
reestablish their credibility by participating in formal procedures, and
may also desire to achieve a dramatic court victory because the attendant
publicity may boost fund-raising efforts. 1 4 6
When an environmental group has initiated an action, or is playing
a major role as an intervenor in a developer-initiated proceeding -- usu-
ally a permit or license application -- the incentives to bargain may be
less, for the two reasons indicated, than where the agency has initiated
the action. In the latter case, it is often the agency which is taking
the lead as the "defender" of the environment (e.g., an enforcement ac-
tion) and so the environmental groups' role is less critical, and less
likely to garner headlines or threaten developers, than when it is they
who are leading the fight. But, as I have noted throughout this thesis,
environmental dispute resolution through bargaining is not the answer to
all environmental conflict. Even if bargaining and settlement occurs only
in enforcement-type settings, that still may be a significant advance in
lessening the costs of environmental disputes and fashioning better solu-
tions.
145It gives the environmental group something to trade: its fore-
going litigation. See Stewart, supra note 28, at 1771.
1 4 6 See Id., at 1772.
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The Agency as "Interested Party" -- Opportunities for Mediation, Conflict
Avoidance and Conflict Anticipation Under the New NEPA Regulations
In late 1978, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) published
its final regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).147 Effective on July 30, 1979,
these new regulations have three principal aims: to reduce paperwork,
148
to reduce delays, and to produce better decisions. One approach to
these aims adopted by the new regulations seeks to make the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) process under NEPA a framework for bargaining, right
from the outset of the feasibility assessment process.
Two sections of the new regulations provide the opportunity for bar-
gaining: Section 1501.2,149 requires agencies to integrate the NEPA pro-
cess with other planning at the earliest possible time; while under Sec-
tion 1501.7,150 a "scoping" process is required that provides a formal
mechanism for agencies, in consultation with affected parties, to identify
significant issues which must be discussed in the EIS. In this section,
I'll examine the way in which these sections will operate and indicate the
opportunities they provide for agency participation in various dispute
resolution efforts.
Section 1501.7 -- The "Scoping" Process
The concept of "scoping" was intended by the CEQ, and importantly,
1 4 7 See 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978).
1 4 8id
14940 C.F.R. § 1501.2.
1 50 Id., at § 1501.7..-
I-W
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was perceived by most of the commenters on the draft regulations, as a
means for early identification of what are -- and what are not -- the im-
portant issues deserving of study in the EIS.152 A major purpose of the
scoping process is to encourage affected parties to identify the crucial
issues raised by a proposal before an environmental impact statement is
prepared in order to reduce the possibility that matters of importance
will be overlooked in the early stages of a NEPA review. Scoping is also
designed to conserve agency resources (by avoiding analysis of issues
which no one believes are important) and, since scoping requires the lead
agency to allocate responsibility for preparing the EIS among affected
agencies, it sets the stage for a more timely, coordinated, and efficient
federal review of a proposal. 1 5 3
Although the scoping process is mandatory,154 important elements of
the process are left to agency discretion.155 The agency decides, within
156
stated limits, when the scoping process occurs, and the regulations pro-
vide only the most general guidelines regarding who should be involved in
the process,157 and how the scope and the significant issues to be analyzed
1 5 1 Commenters included representatives of business, labor, state and
local governments, and environmental groups. See 43 Fed. Reg. supra note
147, at 55980.
15., at 55982.
153Id
154"There shall be an early and open process for determining the
scope of issues. . . ," Id., at 55993.
155 Id., at 55982.
156 Id.
1571I.; 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7(a)(1)
41
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should be determined. The agency is also given discretion to integrate
159
the scoping process with any other early planning meetings the agency has.
Section 1501.2 -- Early Planning Under NEPA
The CEQ regulations call for integration of the EIS process with
other planning "at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and
decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays later in the pro-
cess, and to head off potential conflicts.160 Under this new regulation,
a federal agency may consult with local and state officials, potential
applicants (for federal permits), and interested private persons and or-
ganizations "before Federal involvement." 1 6 1
The purpose of this early planning provision is to assure the full
cooperation and support of federal agencies for efforts by private parties
and state and local entities in making an early start on studies for pro-
162
posals that will eventually be reviewed by the agencies.
Prospects
In the view of Charles Warren, Chairman of the CEQ, these new regu-
lations "attempt to make the EIS a framework for bargaining," and provide
a "promising new opportunity for the skills that mediation involves" to
158See 43 Fed. Reg. supr note 147, at 55982; 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7
(a)(2).
5Id.; 40 C.F.R. 9 1501.7(b)(4).
160Id., at 55992.
161Id.; 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2(d)(l)-(2).
I<., at 55981.
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help us prevent conflict in some cases. Warren states that these new
regulations envision bargaining that "does not fall under the strict defi-
nition of 'mediation' in the sense that contending parties invite a third
person as referee. Yet, it could quite conceivably become so, if the
field develops to the point where federal agencies find it advisable to
retain mediation specialists on their staffs, or if private applicants
find third parties more acceptable to environmental opponents."164
In my view, even if formal mediation never arises directly from the
scoping and early planning negotiations under the new regulations, these
new processes offer agencies the opportunity to practice less formal
methods of dispute resolution such as "conflict assessment" or "conflict
anticipation." Such early negotiations can be preferable to mediation in
the view of one practitioner "because it enables interested parties. . .
to work together before intense fear and distrust have developed and be-
fore serious costs have been incurred." 1 6 5
1 6 3See Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 14.
Id., at 15.
165Id., at 26.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AGENCY PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LEGALITY
OF CONFIDENTIAL BARGAINING
Introduction
There are a number of legal questions raised when government agen-
cies seek to participate in environmental dispute resolution. In this
chapter, I will examine one of these questions in depth, the issue of
confidentiality, and briefly sketch the issues raised by two other major
questions: the desirability of expanded agency discretion and the appro-
priate scope, if any, for judicial review of consensual settlement of
environmental disputes.
In the past fifteen years, both the Congress and the legislatures
of all fifty states have enacted legislation that mandates "open meetings"
167
for most government bodies and gives the public and press the "right to
know" how government decisions are made. But, as I will show, practition-
ers experienced in bargaining procedures believe that confidentiality is
a critical element in the process -- unless meetings are held behind
closed doors and the discussions remain confidential, they feel, bargain-
ing becomes impossible.168 If the open government legislation of recent
years applies to agency participation in environmental resolution ef-
forts, then the confidentiality necessary to the success of bargaining
efforts will be threatened and settlements endangered.
167
The federal statute, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
most state laws, do not apply to the executive, cabinet secretaries, the
legislature, or the courts.
168 See pp 75-77 infra.
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The most direct threat to confidentiality is posed by the govern-
169
ment in the Sunshine provisions of the APA, that require federal govern-
ment meetings to be open to the public. As the case study I will present
shows, frank discussion simply does not occur when the fragile, interper-
sonal, dynamic, bargaining that is at the heart of both negotiation and
mediation is exposed to public scrutiny.
A second, less direct, threat to confidentiality appears in the
Freedom of Information Act,170 also part of the APA, which requires that
federal agencies disclose to the public the records of agency action in
their files. The problem with this "right to know" statute is that future
bargaining will likely be discouraged if the parties know that their deals,
trades, posturing, or just plain ignorance will inevitably be exposed.
The potential embarrassment, loss of face, and disclosure of "roads not
taken," that would result from making bargaining records public would
prove a strong disincentive to participation. Finally, I will briefly
171
describe the relationship of the Federal Advisory Committee Act to the
confidentiality concerns just noted.
AGENCY DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The participation of government agencies in ad hoc informal proces-
ses (such as bargaining in environmental dispute resolution) raises some
critical legal and political questions regarding the desirable extent of
1695 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
170e
_Id. at 552b (1976), as amended.
1 71
Id., at App. I.
gif
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agency discretion in decision-making and the need for, and scope of,
judicial review, or other processes, to check that discretion. Under the
APA, federal agencies are granted only two formal procedures for decision-
making, either adjudicatory proceedings172 or notice and comment rule-
making;l73 the Act is silent as to such procedures as negotiation and
mediation. Yet, as any knowledgeable observer of American administrative
agency practice can testify, informal and highly discretionary processes
form the vast bulk of action taken by agencies.174 In light of this fact,
a number of commentators argue that this vast area of discretionary action
must be circumscribed and regulated, while at the same time note the prac-
tical difficulties in their schemes. 1 7 5
One of the common elements in various proposed schemes for limiting
agency discretion is the use of the courts to review agency decisions.176
1725 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
173
I., at § 553. The acceptance by the federal courts in recent
years of so-called "hybrid rule-making" has been severely criticized by
the Supreme Court in the Vermont Yankee case. See supra note 44.
1 7 4Most scholars estimate that 80-90 percent of agency actions are
informal and discretionary. See K. Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) at
vi. See also Stewart, supra note 28, at 1671-88. Stewart notes that there
is an enormous range of agency discretion pertaining to choices such as:
who is prosecuted and how vigorously; who is offered settlement, and on
what terms, after litigation has commenced; and the working out of agency
policy by negotiation with regulated firms. Id., at 1687.
1 7 5See Davis, supra note 174; Sofaer, "Judicial Control of Informal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement," 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (1972);
Jaffe, supra note 66.
1 7 6See e.g., Zimmer and Sullivan, "Consent Decree Settlements by
Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Opti-
mizing Public and Private Interests," 1976 Duke L. J. 163, 206-224 (1976).
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This can be a difficult and involve'd question when, as here, we are deal-
ing with an innovative practice that differs markedly from formal agency
procedures. Once agencies begin to engage in environmental dispute reso-
lution, we must deal with such issues as the necessity for review of con-
sensual processes, the standards of review, the capacity of the courts to
conduct such review, and the effect of review on the process.
In the Conclusion of this thesis, I address many of these problems
and present my proposals for dealing with the allied problems of agency
discretion and judicial review. For the moment, however, the question
is whether the confidentiality of bargaining processes can be maintained
when the participation of government agencies "trigger" the provisions
of the APA's open meetings and freedom of information provisions.
BARGAINING IN THE SUNSHINE -- AN INHIBITED PROCESS
Underlying the argument against open bargaining sessions for media-
tion or negotiation of environmental disputes is the experience of those
who have attempted to bargain in the "sunshine". For example, Gerald
Cormick has noted that the mediation process leading to settlement of the
1-90 dispute177 was televised, but the greatest progress took place when
the TV cameras were turned off. Only then could the parties talk in a
more relaxed atmosphere. 178
In a more recent case, we can clearly see the problems posed when
environmental mediation has no "clouds" to hide behind. Howard Bellman,
1 7 7See supra note 60.
1 7 8Environmental Mediation, supra note 6, at 32.
ff
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a mediator with the Wisconsin Centei for Public Policy, was invited to
assist in resolving a five-year-old dispute over conflicting sites for
the new $51 million Madison Area Technical College (MATC).179 In that
dispute, Madison city officials have argued for a downtown campus, citing
problems of transportation and urban sprawl. They say the city would be
stuck providing thousands of dollars for extending city services if a
suburban location is chosen. But members of both the MATC board and the
state vocational education board favor a suburban site in the town of
Burke, because they feel the rural location would provide better access
to outlying areas of the Madison vocational school district.1 8 0
When Bellman attempted to bring the feuding parties together in a
closed session to discuss the differences, reporters from two local news-
papers and a radio station refused to leave the room, citing Wisconsin's
open meetings law as the basis for their position.181 Bellman declined
having the reporters removed by the police -- fearing that this would
create a cause celebre that would overshadow the MATC question 182-- but
also refused to continue the meeting in open session. Bellman noted:
"On the basis of the work I have done on this case and on the basis of
1 7 9Telephone interview with Cynthia Sampson, Wisconsin Center for
Public Policy, Madison, Wisconsin, April 20, 1979. (Hereafter cited as
Sampson Interview).
C-T demands open MATC meeting," The Capital Times (Madison),
January 24, 1979, at 1.
1 8 1
"Reporters halt meeting; court opinion sought," The Capita
Times (Madison), January 26, 1979, at 1.
1 8 2Sampson Interview, supra note 179.
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what I have learned about the process of negotiation over a number of
years, bargaining reasons indicate that a closed meeting is required. If
it is not held as a closed session, the bargaining will not be effective
-- negotiations will not be a success." 1 8 3
It soon became evident to Bellman that any attempt to close MATC
bargaining sessions to reporters would only lead to additional publicity
and a suit against the city and MATC board by one of the newspapers.184
Trying both to avoid a media crusade and continue the negotiations, Bell-
man chose to meet with the parties in small groups. By keeping the
groups quite small, Bellman was able to avoid invoking the open meetings
185
law since the prerequisite quorum of a government body was never present.
But in mid-April, 1979, the talks broke down completely. In Bell-
man's view, the problem was directly related to his inability to bring
all the parties together in one room for bargaining. Without these closed
negotiating sessions involving all the public bodies, Bellman found that
he could not build the commitment to the negotiating process he felt was
necessary to make the mediation process work.1 8 6
1 8 3
"Reporters halt meeting; court opinion sought," The Capital
Times (Madison), January 26, 1979, at 1.
1 84 The Capital Times newspaper was adamantly opposed to the closed
negotiating sessions. Its editor wrote, "Both the City Council and the
MATC board claim the purpose of the talks is to 'conduct other public
business, which for competitve or bargaining reasons, require a closed
session.' That is lawyers' doubletalk for freezing the taxpayers out of
a meeting in which a handful of men behind closed doors decide how to
spend $51 million of public funds." See "Public business in secret," The
Capital Times (Mvladisoa) January 25, 1979.
1 8 5 Sampson Interview, supra note 179.
1 8 6 Sampson Interview, supra note 179.
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SUNSHINE ACTS: MUST BARGAINING BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC?
In 1976, the Congress enacted the Government in the Sunshine Act.18 7
In the words of the House Report, "this legislation represents a further,
logical step in the continuing process of opening governmental decision-
making to the public at the Federal and State levels."l88 As will be seen
with the Freedom of Information Act,189 state legislatures had first en-
acted similar statutory schemes, and today all fifty states have legisla-
tion requiring that certain meetings of governmental bodies be open to the
public.1 9 0
Scope
The Sunshine Act is not as broad as the Freedom of Information Act;
the mandate to open meetings to the public applies only to an agency
"headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a
majority of whom are appointed to such position by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. . . ."191 Thus, the Act does not apply
1 8 7Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
(Although the Act is codified in various sections of Titles 5 and 39 U.S.C.,
it is only the Act's open meetings provisions found in 5 U.S.C. § 552b that
we consider here.)
8 8 H.R. Rep. No. 880, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. n.6 at 4 (hereafter
cited as House Report).
1895 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(e) (1976).
1 9 0 See "Where's the Sunshine? Inadequacy of Pennsylvania's Open
Meeting Law," 82 Dick. L. Rev. 719 (1978) for a compilation of the fifty
state statutes at 719, n.4; the provisions of the state statutes then in
effect are summarized in Hollow and Ennis, "Tennessee Sunshine: The People's
Business Goes Public," 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 527, 535 n.34 (1975).
1915 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976).
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to single-headed federal departments such as Defense, HEW, HUD or to
single-headed federal agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency.
The Senate Government Operations Committee, which reported the bill, ex-
plained the reasons behind this distinction:
Multiheaded agencies operate on the principle of give-and-
take discussion between agency heads. There is a tradition
of public dissent; though the agency takes a final action,
it does not necessarily speak with one voice. The agency
heads are high public officials, having been selected and
confirmed through a process very different from that used
for staff members. Their deliberate process can be appro-
priately exposed to public scrutiny in order to give citi-
zens an awareness of the process and rationale of decision-
making.
The single-headed agency acts differently. Only the single
head is ultimately responsible for agency actions, while
the staff functions as extensions of the head. Opening
staff meetings presents many complications, not the least
of which is determining which of the innumerable staff
meetings that occur every day should be open. While these
difficulties may not be insurmountable, they require a dif-
ferent approach than that used in [the Act]. 1 9 2
The Committee then went on to estimate that some forty-seven federal
agencies, including most of the regulatory agencies, would come under the
Act. 193
The Sunshine Act requires that "every portion of every meeting of
an agency shall be open to public observation,"194 unless it falls within
an exemption. Exemptions are permissive rather than mandatory, and a
strong presumption in favor of openness exists.195 The Sunshine Act shares
192S. Rep. No. 354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 16-17 (hereafter
cited as Senate Report).
Id., at 15-16.
1945 U.S.C. § 552b (b) (1976).
1 9 5 See Senate Report, supra note 192, at 3, 20; "The Government in
the Sunshine Act - An Overview," 1977 Duke L. J. 565, 567 n. 11 (1977).
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a number of exemptions with the Freedom of Information Act; both exempt
from disclosure the following information:196 classified information
197 198(relating to national defense and foreign policy); personnel matters;
matters exempted by statute;199 trade secrets and confidential business
information;200 matters constituting an unwarranted invasion of personal
201 .202 203
privacy; investigatory records; and bank reports. In addition,
the Sunshine Act provides for three other exemptions: matters concerning
criminal accusation or formal censure;204 disclosures which would be pre-
1 9 6 Insofar as the exemptions of the Sunshine Act follow those of
the Freedom of Information Act, they should be accorded similar judicial
interpretation. Senate Report, supra note 192, at 20. Thus, discussion
of the effect of the exemptions on bargaining is found in the Freedom of
Information Act section. See pp. infra.
1975 U.S.C. §552b(c)(1)(1976); see generally K. Davis, 1 Adminis-
trative Law Treatise, 2d ed. (1978) ch. 5: "The Government in the Sun-
shine Act - An Overview," 1977 Duke L. J. 565 (1977); Hirschorn, "Sun-
shine for Federal Agencies," 63 A.B.A. J. 55 (1977); Cox "A Walk Through
Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act: the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act; the Privacy Act; and the Government in the Sunshine Act," 46
Cinn. L. Rev. 969, 981-87 (1977); Wickham, "Let the Sun Shine In!: Open
Meeting Legislation Can Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local
Government," 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480 (1973) (hereafter cited as Wickham I).
1985 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(2)(matters that "relate solely to the internal
personnel rules and practices of an agency").
19 1., § 552(c)(3).
20 0 Id., § 552(c)(4).
201Id., § 552(c)(6).
202Id., § 552(c)(7).
3Id, § 552(c)(8).
Id., § 552(c)(5).
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mature and harmful in certain circumstances;205 and information relating
to litigation, arbitration, or adjudication.2 0 6
Conflicting Interests
These specific exemptions indicate that the value of open govern-
ment is not absolute, other legitimate interests may be threatened by a
strict rule of openness. All Sunshine legislation, both state and federal,
has acknowledged the need to promote an accommodation between potentially
conflicting interests. 207
Where compromise and consensus are a necessary part of the govern-
mental process, closed debate has significant advantages. This was the
case during the Constitutional Convention of 1787, according to constitu-
tional scholar Paul Freund:
Secrecy, it is fair to suppose, promoted free and candid
debate within the convention, and vitally encouraged the
shifts in voting, the great compromises, calculated ambig-
uities and deliberate lacunae that made possible in the
end a masterful charter. . . .208
20508
2 0 5Id. § 552(c)(9) ("disclose information premature disclosure of
which would --
(A) (relates to financial institutions)
(B) in the case of any agency, be likely to significantly frustrate
implementation of a proposed agency action. . . .
Id. 552(c)(10).
2 0 7See Note, "Government in the Sunshine: Judicial Application and
Suggestions for Reform," 2 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 537, 552 (1974); Recchie
and Chernoski, "Government in the Sunshine: Open Meeting Legislation in
Ohio," 37 Ohio St. L. J. 497, 507 (1976); Note, "Open Meeting Statutes:
the Press Fights for the 'Right to Know'," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1199, 1203
(1962).
2 0 8 Freund, "On Prior Restraint," Harvard Law School Bulletin, August,
1971 at 3, quoted in Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So, 2d 425, 426-7 n. 4 (Fla.
1972).
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This need for privacy, particularly during the early stages of debate,
is an institutional need whose denial is likely to diminish the quality
of final decision-making, and, ironically, work against the very public
interest that openness was meant to serve. The case has been well-stated
by Professor Douglas Wickham:
[I]n the early stages of working out a particular problem,
it makes a good deal of sense for any governmental body
to retain a zone of privacy within which its members can
air internal disagreements. A position, once publicly
taken, is not easily changed; and it seems undesirable
to encourage the adoption of "first thoughts" by requiring
that all collective governmental thinking be done in pub-
lic. Few subordinates would feel free to offer construc-
tive ideas for fear of appearing to be in opposition to the
eventual decision of the final authority. The value com-
peting against a "right to know" then is not a "right to
secrecy", but an assurance of some insulation from the in-
tense heat of public pressure. Priorities must be deter-
mined, decisions made, and programs implemented. Absolute
openness will detract from the overall public interest in
informed and rational governmental decisions.2 0 9
If we can now say that the public's interest in open meetings is
not absolute, are there any arguments favoring closed meetings when govern-
ment officials participate in environmental bargaining?
Mediation in the Shade -- Reason and Precedent
While Professor Wickham has been one of the more vocal proponents
of open meeting legislation,210 he notes that there are "situations upon
which there is some consensus that openness is undesirable." 2 1 1 Among
2 0 9Wickham I, supra note 197, at 481-82 (footnotes omitted).
210 See Wickham I, supra note 197; Wickham, "Tennessee's Sunshine
Law: A Need for Limited Shade and Clearer Focus," 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 557
(1975) (hereafter cited as Wickham II).
2 1 1Wickham I, supra note 197, at 485.
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these is collective bargaining:212 "Commentators have long recognized
the infeasibility of conducting collective bargaining negotiations in
public. The give-and-take of compromise involves too much loss of face
to expect the participants to bargain freely before outside observers."213
Collective bargaining negotiations simply cannot effectively be carried
out if open to the public, and much the same can be said for environmental
negotiation or mediation since they too are ultimately based on the "give-
and-take" of bargaining.
In a number of states, the need for privacy in collective bargaining
has been recognized by the legislature and the state open meetings statute
will specifically exempt collective bargaining sessions.214 The Michigan
statute is illustrative, allowing closed meetings "For strategy and negoti-
ation sessions connected with the negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement when either negotiating party requests a closed hearing." 2 1 5
Most states, however, have not provided for such an exemption. In
216 217
Florida, for example, whose sunshine law is one of the most stringent,
allowing for no exemptions to the open meeting requirements other than
2 1 2Wickham I, supra note 197, at 490.
2 1 3Wickham II, supra note 210, at 564.
214
Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington,
and Wyoming had provisions as of 1976.
2 1 50pen Meetings Act, Sec. 8, M.C.L. 15.261 et.seq. (West Supp.
1978); see Wexford Cty. Prosecuting Atty. v. Pranger, 268 N.W. 2d 344
(Mich. C.A. 1978).
2 1 6Fla. Stat. Ann. § 286.011 (West 1975).
2 1 7The statute is criticized for its lack of exemptions, especially
for personal matters, in Note, "Government in the Sunshine: Promise or
Placebo?" 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 361, 371 (1971).
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those mandated by interpretation of the state constitution, the state
supreme court refused, for many years, to recognize any implicit exemp-
tions.218 But in 1972, the court reversed itself in the case of Bassett
v. Braddock,219 finding that policy considerations of pragmatism and
fairness220 led it to find labor negotiations exempt from the open meet-
ings requirement.
In Bassett, the state court construed Florida's constitutional
guarantee of the right of employees to bargain collectively as exempting
the negotiations from sunshine requirements, since "meaningful collective
bargaining in the circumstances here would be destroyed if full publicity
were accorded at each stage of the negotiation."221 The court found "im-
pressive, uncontroverted testimony by respectable national authorities in
the field. . ." that collective bargaining would be futile if held under
the spotlight of public scrutiny.222 The court reasoned that there would
be no problem "so long as the ultimate debate and decisions are public and
the 'official acts' and 'formal action' specified by the statute are taken
in open 'public meetings'. This affords the adequate and effective protec-
223
tion to the public on the side of the 'right to know' which was intended.
The court in Bassett also held that the officials of the public
218See e.g., Bd. of Public Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla.
1969); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971).
219262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
2 2 0See Comment, "Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud on the
Horizon," 25 U. Fla. L. Rev. 603, 608 (1973).
221262 So. 2d 425, at 426.
222 id.
23Idt., at 427.
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agency could instruct and consult with its negotiators in private. 2 2 4
This further extension of the right to privacy is important because the
formulation of strategy by the bargaining parties is an integral part of
the negotiating process. Were negotiating sessions closed and strategy
sessions open, little would be gained.
Other courts have followed the lead of Florida. In Talbot v. Con-
cord Union School District,225 the New Hampshire supreme court was con-
sidering the defendant school board's refusal to permit the plaintiff, a
reporter, to attend the bargaining committee's sessions. The parties
had agreed that none of the exceptions to the New Hampshire Right to Know
Law226 were applicable and the issue presented to the court was whether
the committee's bargaining sessions were within the purview of the Act.
The court clearly understood the nature of the competing interests,
noting that there were "two legislative policies which bear on this issue.
The first policy is that of the Right to Know Law, which is to protect
the democratic process by making public the decisions and considerations
on which government is based."2 2 7 The second was the collective bargaining
statute which recognizes the right of public employees to negotiate with
the government.228
224
.262 So. 2d 425, at 428; see also City of Winter Haven v. Florida
Pub. Emp. Rel. Comm., 358 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. App. 1978)(Discussions and
consultations of the chief executive officer of a public employer with the
legislative body relative to collective bargaining are exempt from open
meetings law).
225323 A.2d 912 (N.H. 1974).
2 2 6RSA 91-A:3 (Supp. 1973)
2 2 7 323,A.2d, supra note 225, at 913.
228id
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The court found no guidance in the legislative history of the Right
to Know Law, but reasoned that "it is improbable that the legislature in-
tended the law to apply in such a fashion as to destroy the very process
[i.e., collective bargaining] it was attempting to open to the public." 2 2 9
Accepting the holding of Bassett, the court agreed that there was "sub-
stantial authority" in support of the position that the "delicate mechan-
isms of collective bargaining would be thrown awry if viewed prematurely
by the public."2 3 0
In another decision,231 following Bassett and Talbot, the Iowa su-
preme court found that it would be impermissible to allow a school board
to unilaterally determine that negotiating sessions be open "since bar-
gaining in public would tend to inhibit, if not destroy, the bargaining
process. 232 The Iowa court found particularly persuasive the fact that
229323 A. 2d, supra note 225, at 913.
Id.; see authorities cited in the opinion. Contra.Littleton Educ.
Ass'n v. Arapahoe City School Dist., 553 P. 2d 793 (Colo. 1976) (Distin-
guishes Bassett on grounds that in Florida public employees have a consti-
tutionally protected right to bargain collectively which was held to be
infringed by mandating open sessions, while Colorado has neither consti-
tutional nor statutory provisions for collective bargaining in the public
sector.)
The Colorado court in this case avoided any discussion of the com-
peting interests at stake, simply finding that citizens "should have an
opportunity to become fully informed." (at 798). Further, the court ap-
pears to have misread Bassett. The Florida constitutional provision at
issue (Art. I § 6) guaranteed collective bargaining for employees. In the
absence of implementing legislation, the Florida court applied the guaran-
tee to the school teachers because "To do otherwise could well deny the
public employees' rights to bargain collectively." (at 426).
2 3 1Burlington Community School Dist. v. Public Employees Relations
Bd., 268 N.W. 2d 517 (Iowa 1978).
232Id., at 523.
MI
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several state labor boards have ruled that a public employer's unilateral
demand that negotiating sessions be opened amounts to bad faith on the
part of the employer since the bargaining process would be virtually des-
troyed.2 3 3
Further authority in favor of the general proposition that collec-
tive bargaining sessions need not be opened to the public is found in the
Bassett case where cited opinions of the Attorneys General of Massachu-
setts and Wisconsin state that there is no violation of their respective
sunshine laws where labor negotiations are held behind closed-doors. 2 3 4
Also, the American Bar Association's Committee on State Labor Law found
that "the record indicates a prevailing belief that the presence of the
public and/or the press at negotiating sessions will most likely inhibit
the free exchange of views and tend to freeze negotiations into fixed
positions." 2 3 5
Conclusion
Read together, the statutory history of the Act, the views of dis-
tinguished scholars, and the statutes and cases from a number of states
that exclude collective bargaining from "Sunshine" provisions, argue
strongly, I feel, for the proposition that bargaining sessions in environ-
mental mediation and negotiation processes may legitimately be closed.
This position is only strengthened when we examine the earlier Freedom
of Information Act and see how the courts and scholars have interpreted
2 3 3 Burlington Community School Dist. v. Public Employees Relations
Bd., 268 N.W. 2d 517 (Iowa 1978); see state board rulings listed here.
2 3 4 See 262 So. 2d, supra note 219 at 427 n. 9.
235Id., at 427.
- 88 -
its exemptions.
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
History
The original Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 did little to
change the tradition of federal agency control of access to information
in their files. Section Three of the Act236 provided that matters of of-
ficial record would be available to the public subject to several quali-
fications: the matters must be of official record; items covered by vari-
ous "secrecy" statutes were unaffected; access to information was to be
in accordance with published agency rules; persons seeking access had to
show that they were properly and directly concerned; and agencies could
hold documents "confidential for good cause" as they saw fit.2 3 7
The first call for a fundamental change in this general pattern of
agency secrecy came from the press, which for years had felt frustrated
by its inability to learn more about the operation of the federal govern-
ment. In 1953, the American Society of Newspaper Editors commissioned a
study of governmental secrecy that,238 when published, heightened the in-
terest of both the press and legislators in secrecy in the Executive de-
partments and agencies. Over the next dozen years, support for greater
2365 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
237 id.
2 3 8H. Cross, The Public's Right to Know (1953). The author, Harold
Cross, was counsel for the New York-Herald Tribune and a professor at
Columbia University. See H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1966] U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News 2418, 2419 (hereafter cited as
House Report).
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public access to government files g-rew in both the House and Senate. 2 3 9
In February, 1965, Freedom of Information Act legislation was intro-
duced in Congress.240 Senator Long (D.-Mo.), who introduced the Senate
version, quoted James Madison in explaining the philosophy behind the pro-
posed law:
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who
mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with
the power knowledge gives. A popular government without
popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but
a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or perhaps both.2 4 1
To assure the public access to information, Long explained that the "pur-
pose of the present bill. . .[is] to establish a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure. . "242
But Long also recognized that:
[At] the same time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of
information ' is enacted into law, it is necessary to pro-
tect certain equally important rights of privacy. . .
and
also necessary for the very operation of our Govern-
ment to allow it to keep confidential material. . .243
Long concluded that: "It is not an easy task to balance the opposing
2 3 9See Note, "Comments on Proposed Amendments to Section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 N.D.
Lawy. 417 (1956).
2 4 0H.R. 5012, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965); S.1160, 89th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1965).
24S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965). (hereafter
cited as Senate Report).
242
Id., at 3.
243 Id.
-1
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interests, but it is not an impossible one either. "244
The problem of balancing "the opposing interests" is addressed in
the Freedom of Information Act245 (FOIA) by means of nine specific exemp-
tions from the general mandate of full agency disclosure: national de-
fense; internal personnel practices; matters exempted by statute; trade
secrets and confidential business information; certain types of inter-
agency and intra-agency memoranda; matters constituting an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; investigatory records; bank and other finan-
cial institution reports; and certain geological data pertaining to
wells.2 4 6
Despite the availability of these exemptions, the FOIA had been
vigorously opposed by the federal agencies,247 and passage of the Act did
not magically open previously closed doors.248 Congressional dissatis-
faction with agency reluctance to provide information when requested by
the public, coupled with the legislators' distaste for a series of federal
court decisions that had upheld agency nondisclosure,249 eventually led to
2 4 4 Senate Report, supra note 241, at 3.
2 4 5Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
246 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
2 4 7See Note, supra note 239, at 417.
248
Saee H.R. Rep. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. (1972).
249See, eg., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) (allowing courts to
defer to expert agency judgment in military secret cases under the (b)(1)
exemption); see also Aspin v. Dept. of Defense, 491 F. 2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F. 2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974) cgrt. denied,
419 U.S. 974 (1974); Center for National Policy Review on Race and Urban
Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F. 2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Weisberg v. U.S.
Dept. of Justice, 489 F. 2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (all four of these
cases dealt with the (b)(7) exemptions for agency investigatory files).
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a movement to amend the Act.250 The Congress was particularly concerned
about the "overuse" of exemptions; long delays in providing information;
251
and a general agency attitude of noncompliance. To address these con-
cerns, the proposed amendments tightened the language of exemptions (b)
(1) (national defense) and (b)(7) (investigatory records), placed strict
252
limits on the timing of agency compliance, provided for disciplinary
action against an officer or employee who violates the Act,253 and allowed
a court to assess attorney fees and other litigation costs against the
government when a complaint was successfully prosecuted.254 Although
vetoed by President Ford, Congress overrode his veto and the amendments
became law on February 19, 1975.255
The Act and Environmental Mediation
Under the FOIA, "any person"256 may request records of a federal
agency and, unless those records fall within one of the nine exemptions
to the Act, the agency must make the records "promptly available." 257if
an agency has participated in an environmental mediation effort, the re-
2 5 0See Note, "Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act --
1974," 1975 Duke L. J. 416 (1975).
2 5 1House Report 92-1419, supra note 248.
2525 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976).
253
Id., at (a)(4)(F).
254 Id_. at (a)(4)(E).
2 5 5Pub. L. No. 93-502; 88 Stat. 1561 (1974).
2565 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976).
2 5 7See K. Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise, 2d. ed. (1978) ch. 5,
for a full description of the operation of the Act.
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cords of its participation (e.g., transcripts of meetings, memoranda re-
garding negotiations, documents furnished by other parties, letters to
other concerned agencies, etc.) could be made public if not covered by an
exemption.2 5 8
Public accessibility to agency records or orders regarding an en-
vironmental mediation effort should be encouraged to the extent such ac-
cessibility is limited to final orders and statements of policy regarding
agency action (or, inaction). However, permitting public access to agency
records of the negotiation sessions themselves, or to the agency's inter-
nal deliberative process, or confidential information furnished by private
parties, destroys the privacy of mediation and thus discourages future
mediation efforts. 259
The principal danger of openness in the bargaining process, as has
been noted, is that it inhibits the "give-and-take" associated with bar-
gaining and makes meaningful negotiation difficult.260 The negotiating
parties simply don't want their private bargaining process exposed. Fur-
ther, if agency records of negotiation and deliberation were available,
agency officials may become hesitant to participate in environmental media-
258§ 552(a)(2)(B) requires each agency to make available for public
inspection and copying "those statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal
Register."
§ 552(a)(2)(A) requires each agency to make available for public in-
spection and copying "final opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases."
Reading the two sections together, it seems likely that any agency
action (or, in some cases, inaction) stemming from an environmental media-
tion effort would trigger the Act.
2 5 9 See pp. 7 5-7 7  supra.
2 6 0 See ABA Committee on State Labor Law
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tion for fear that their tentative ideas, erroneous opinions, or just
plain ignorance would be made public. The drafters of the FOIA recog-
nized this problem: "It would be impossible to have any frank discussion
of legal or policy matters in writing if all such writings were to be
subjected to public scrutiny."261 Finally, legitimate privacy interests
or confidential information could be endangered by public access, leading
private parties to avoid mediation efforts involving government agencies.
In short, if forced to "operate in a fishbowl,"262 it is doubtful that
environmental mediation efforts could succeed.
The Exemptions
If the privacy of negotiations is to be maintained, we must deter-
mine whether any of the nine exemptions available under the Act would be
applicable to the records263 of an agency which had participated in an
environmental mediation effort. The exemptions most likely to be o' use
are: (b)(4)264 (confidential business information); (b)(5)265 (inter-
2 6 1Senate Report, supra note 241, at 9, quoted in EPA v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 87 (1973).
2 6 2 Id.
It would be possible, of course, for an agency to participate in
an environmental mediation effort and avoid compliance with the FOIA by
simply not putting anything in writing; the Act applies only to written
records. This is not wholly impractical either: for example, all notes,
minutes, resolutions, etc. could be produced and controlled by private
parties, and all agency deliberations could be oral.
2645 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). "trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial."
Id. at (b)(5). "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums (sic)
or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with -the agency."
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agency and intra-agency memoranda);' and (b)(7)266 (investigatory records).
Exemption (b)(4)
The purpose of exemption (b)(4) is the protection of a legitimate
private need, the ability of private parties to discuss with government
confidential matters that have not been made public.267 The drafters of
this exemption specifically included negotiation and mediation efforts
as examples of processes where confidentiality concerns outweigh the
public's need to have access to agency records:
This exemption would assure the confidentiality of infor-
mation obtained by government through questionnaires or
through material submitted and disclosures made in pro-
cedures such as the mediation of labor-management contro-
versies. . . .This exemption would include. . .negotia-
tion positions or requirements in the case of labor-
management mediations. 268
The legislative intent in this area is apparently so clear, that
no case has arisen in which the issue of access to mediation records under
the FOIA has been litigated. But, were a case to arise in the context of
environmental mediation, we can look to other authority besides the Act's
legislative history to sustain a finding of nondisclosure based on this
exemption.
The exemption covers three distinct types of material: (1) trade
2665 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). "investigatory records compiled
for law enforcement purposes, but only. to the extent that the production
of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) de-
prive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privace:. .
2 6 7See House Report, supra note 248, at 2427.
268Id
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secrets;269 (2) commercial information;270 and (3) financial informa-
tion.271 The latter two must be confidential or privileged and obtained
from a person outside the federal government. The term "confidential"
in the context of the (b)(4) exemption requires a subjective analysis of
whether the matters are customarily held in confidence, according to the
Act's drafters. 2 7 2
The courts, in interpreting this subjective test, have established
certain objective criteria to test whether a matter deserves confidential
status. One statement of the objective test is found in National Parks
and Conservation Assn. v. Morton:2 7 3
[C]ommercial or financial matter is 'confidential' for
purposes of the exemption if disclosure of the infor-
mation is likely to have either of the following effects:
(1) to impair the Government's ability to obtain neces-
sary information in the future; or (2) to cause substan-
tial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information was obtained.2 7 4
Deterrence of future submissions of information to the federal
agency is the first aspect of this objective test. In other words, the
2 6 9 Because the law as to what constitutes trade secrets is fairly
well-settled, we will not discuss it at length here. See R. Milgrim,
Trade Secrets (1976).
2 7 0See Note, "Public Disclosure of Confidential Business Informa-
tion under the Freedom of Information Act," 60 Cornell L.R. 109 (1974).
271id
2 72See Senate Report, supra note 241, at 9 ("to protect the confi-
dentiality of information. . .which would customarily not be released to
the public by the person from whom it was obtained. . .
273498 F. 2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (confidential treatment of profit
and loss figures); see Comment, "National Parks v. Morton," 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 470 (1974).
13I., at 770.
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court recognizes that confidential information may not be shared with
federal agencies if the agencies cannot keep such information from public
view.2 7 5 This would appear to acknowledge the validity of the House Re-
port's concern that mediation, negotiation and other bargaining proces-
ses should be exempt from the Act. Shielding such matters by use of the
fourth exemption would safeguard the confidentiality of information pro-
vided to federal agencies in negotiations and encourage the mediation
process. At the same time, it should not be too difficult for the agency
to define a set of standards for disclosure that would assure the public
that this exemption would not be abused. 2 7 6
The second aspect of the Morton court's test, information that
could harm a private party's competitive position, provides a further
safeguard to maintaining the confidentiality of the mediation process.
It guarantees the private party that its most sensitive information, and,
potentially most costly if revealed to the public, would certainly be
safeguarded.2 7 7
Taken as a whole, the legislative history of the Act and the posi-
tion of the courts and agencies regarding exemption (b)(4) indicates that
it alone would offer a significant guarantee of confidentiality to the
environmental mediation process. Congress clearly foresaw that mediation
efforts assisted by federal agencies would be imperiled by the disclosure
275
See Pennzoil v. FPC, 534 F. 2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976) (In deciding
whether information should be disclosed, the Commission first had to con-
sider whether disclosure would significantly aid it in fulfilling its
function).
2 7 6The EPA already has a set of sophisticated regulations which allow
it to withhold information for "reasons of business confidentiality" if
satisfactory showings are made. See 40 C.F.R. 9 2.201(e).
2 7 7 See Pennzoil v. FPC, supra note 275.
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provisions of the Act, and the courts have agreed that the Act should
not apply to confidential business information if disclosure would impair
the ability of a federal agency to obtain such information in the future.
Finally, agencies have shown that they can draft regulations which both
safeguard confidentiality and provide the public access to information in
their files.
Exemption (b)(7)
In its present, amended, form, (b)(7) applies to all documents whose
purpose is to assist an agency inquiry into specific conduct which might
be found to have violated a statute or regulation administered by that
278 279
agency. The exemption applies both to civil and criminal violations.
In the context of environmental mediation, the (b)(7) exemption
would most likely apply where the government agency and a private party
were attempting to negotiate compliance with a regulation or a remedy for
a violation. In these cases, the justification for nondisclosure would
rely on one of the following subsections: (A) (interference with enforce-
ment proceedings); (B) (deprives a person the right to an impartial adju-
dication); and (C) (an unwarranted invasion of privacy).2 8 0
278
In the original FOIA, this exemption was very broad -- the exemp-
tion formerly read: "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes -except to the extent available to a party other than an agency;"
see 5 U.S.C. 0 552(b)(7) (1970). Dissatisfaction with the wholesale ex-
clusion of records from disclosure under (b)(7) led to its amendment in
1974, the effect of which was to narrow the exemption significantly. See
Kramer and Weinberg, "The Freedom of Information Act," 63 Geo. L. J. 49
(1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F. 2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
2 7 9See Davis, supra note 257, at 435.
2805 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)-(C) (1976).
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It is difficult to say how the courts would approach the issue of
agency nondisclosures based on this exemption.281 Still, a reasonable
formula appears in a case involving nondisclosure by a civil regulatory
agency, exactly the type of agency that would participate in environmental
mediation. In Retail Credit Co. v. FTC,282 the court identified the
elements an agency should be required to demonstrate to justify nondis-
closure: (1) that the documents were compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses; (2) that the information will be used in a present, or future pro-
ceeding; and (3) a showing that disclosure would interfere with enforce-
ment proceedings or constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy.283 Thus, where the mediation was addressing possible violations of
agency regulations, an agency showing that disclosure would harm the medi-
ation effort should, under this formula, be sufficient to justify nondis-
closure. Of course, most likely the same result could have been obtained
by using the more general (b)(4) exemption.
Exemption (b)(5)
Another exemption that will be of great use to an agency seeking to
281Most of the courts which have considered the exemption faced a
request from a hearing respondent or other litigant. See Note, "Back-
dooring the NLRB," 8 Loy. L. J. 145 (1976). In the case of a mediated
settlement, of course, a nonparty would be seeking disclosure.
2821976-1 CCH Trade Cas. No. 60727 (1976).
283Id. See also Getman v. NLRB, 450 F. 2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(cited by this court as outlining the considerations relevant to deter-
mining whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy). Interestingly, the Retail Credit court failed to
note that the standard in Getman, involving a (b)(6) exemption ("clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"), was stricter than the stan-
dard in (b)(7)(C) ("an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy").
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maintain the confidentiality of the environmental mediation process is
(b)(5), which permits federal agencies to withhold "inter-agency or intra-
agency memorandums or letters which would not be available to a party other
than an agency in litigation with the agency." Because the language of
(b)(5) clearly refers to the traditional concepts of discovery proceedings,
the courts have used those concepts in interpreting this exemption. 2 84
The legislative history of the Act states that the fifth exemption
is intended to preserve the process of agency decision-making from the
natural muting of full and frank discussion which would occur if all in-
ternal communications were made public. An agency cannot "operate in a
fishbowl. ,285
The cases that have arisen under (b)(5) make clear that the fifth
exemption protects the deliberative materials produced in the process of
making agency decisions.286 Where such deliberative materials are written
communications or the written records of oral conversations or interviews,
they are clearly encompassed by the "memorandums or letters" language in
the exemption.2 8 7
2 8 4 See e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Corp., 421 U.S.
168 (1975); NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). Note, how-
ever, that in the civil discovery context the position of the party seek-
ing discovery is often dispositive of his ability to override a privilege
claim. The FOIA, on the other hand, does not contemplate that the indivi-
dual need of the plaintiff will be considered as a factor in determining
whether disclosure is proper. See House Report, supra note 248, at 2426;
NLRB v. Sears Roebuck Co., supra, at 149 n. 16.
285
House Report, supra note 248, at 2427.
2 8 6See e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87 (1973); NLRB v. Sears Roe-
buck & Co., supra note 284; see also, Davis, supra note 257, at 405.
2 8 7 ee Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (ND Cal. 1971).
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The major distinction that the courts have used to describe what
should be protected from disclosure under exemption (b)(5) is that between
"factual" and "deliberative" materials, exempting only the latter. 2 8 8
Nevertheless, factual information will be protected when it is "inextric-
ably intertwined with policy-making process,"289 and the courts will only
sever factual material from deliberative memoranda if it does not compro-
290
mise the deliberative process.
Another distinction has been drawn "between predecisional memoranda
prepared in order to assist an agency decision-maker in arriving at his
decision, which are exempt from disclosure, and postdecisional memoranda
setting forth the reasons for an agency decision already made, which are
not."291 This distinction is also supported by the Act's legislative
.292history.
In a recent case, Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Air
Force,293 the court devised a more functional test than either the fact-
2 8 8 See e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89-90 (1973).
2 8 9 Soucie v. David, 448 F. 2d 1067, 1077-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see
also Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F. 2d 238, 249 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (purely factual matter may be exempt if inextricable without
compromise of deliberate process).
2 9 0Id. Note, however, that even when factual material is "severable"
so that disclosure is possible under (b)(5), such material still may be
withheld under exemption (b)(4); see Fisher v. Renegotiation Board, 355 F.
Supp. 1171 (D.C. D.C. 1973).
2 9 1Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184
(1975).
2 9 2 See House Report, supra note 248, at 2422-23.
293566 F. 2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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policy or pre-post decisional distinctions, stating that: "A decision
that certain information falls within exemption five should. . . rest
fundamentally on the conclusion that, unless protected from public dis-
closure, information of that type would not flow freely within the
agency."294 Applying that test to the facts before it, the court found,
in a case involving negotiation of a government contract, that the (b)(5)
exemption applied to the records of agency deliberations regarding its
negotiation position,295 but not to an agency record of the "summary of
the offers and counter-offers made by each side" in the negotiations.296
In distinguishing between the records of agency deliberations and
recorded summaries of the actual negotiations, Judge Tamm overruled the
district court, provoking a dissent from his own colleague, Judge McGowan.
Tamm argued that there was a clear difference between the records of an
agency's "internal self-evaluation of its contract negotiations" and
"[i]nformation about the 'deliberative' or negotiating process outside an
agency," with only the former deserving exemption under (b)(5). 297 Judge
McGowan found this distinction "untenable", noting that "[e]ven a bare
recitation of the offers and counter-offers between . . . [the parties]
. . cannot help but reflect internal agency decisions and negotiating
strategy." 298
Additional support for Judge McGowan's position can be found in the
294566 F. 2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1977), at 256.
295566 F. 2d, supra note 293, at 257.
2 96Id.
297id
28Id., at 264.
Uj
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dicta of the Tamm opinion. In a different fact situation from the case
at hand, Judge Tamm noted, "Perhaps it could be shown that the threat of
disclosure of negotiation proceedings would so inhibit private parties
from dealing with the Government that agencies must be permitted to with-
hold such information. . . "299 and stated that the courts would not re-
quire disclosure where an agency could ". . .show by specific and detailed
proof that disclosure would defeat, rather than further, the purposes of
the FOIA."3 0 0 Thus, both the logic of the McGowan dissent and Judge
Tamm's admission that an agency could withhold the records of a negotiation
process upon a sufficient showing indicate that a strong argument could be
made against disclosure of mediation proceedings under exemption (b)(5).
Conclusion
It appears that an agency can fashion a strong argument for non-
disclosure of documents which constitute the record of an environmental
mediation process where disclosure of the documents would violate agency
or third party concerns regarding confidentiality. In such cases, the
public's right to know must be balanced against a number of critical fac-
tors: (1) the confidentiality and privacy concerns of private parties;
(2) the confidentiality of the governmental deliberation process; (3) the
government's ability to obtain confidential information if it cannot as-
sure that confidentiality will be maintained; and (4) whether disclosure
will frustrate the operation of government.
299566 F. 2d supra note 293, at 258.
3 0 0 d.
.07
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In judging disclosure requests under the FOIA, the courts must at-
tempt to avoid the twin pitfalls of arbitrary disclosure or an equally
arbitrary secrecy. Environmental mediation should not become a blanket
justification for an agency to keep records from the public view; on the
other hand, to force agency disclosure of confidential information (and
thus make it impossible to obtain in the future) or expose the records
of sensitive bargaining sessions and hard-fought agency debates on nego-
tiating positions, will likely discourage any agency participation in
environmental mediation. While a policy of selective disclosure may be
difficult, it is not impossible, and the courts are quite capable of de-
ciding when an agency has justified withholding records on the basis of
the "specific and detailed proof"301 which it has provided.
THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT302
Unlike a federal agency, which has a statutory function, is composed
of government employees, and has substantial independent authority, a
federal advisory committee is a group of individuals, comprised of non-
agency employees303 "established or utilized" by one or more federal agen-
cies, or by statute or Presidential order, in the interest of obtaining
advice or recommendations for a federal agency or for the President. 3 0 4
301566 F. 2d, supra note 293, at 258.
3 0 2Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), as amended Pub. L. No.
94-409, § 5(c), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976), 5 U.S.C. App. I (1976).
303
Some federal employees may serve on some committees, but no ad-
visory committee may be comprised wholly of federal employees. See 5
U.S.C. App. I § 3(2) (1976).
3 0 4 Id.
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Examples of such advisory committees are: President's Council on Physi-
cal Fitness and Sports; Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety
and Health; and the United States Tax Court Nominating Commission.3 0 5
For the purpose of this thesis, it is not necessary to discuss the
general purpose and operation of the Act.306 The same concerns for the
public's right to know that were expressed in the Freedom of Information
Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act underlie this legislation,
and I will merely note that advisory committees are subject to both the
307
open meetings provisions of the Sunshine Act and the disclosure re-
quirements of the FOIA.3 0 8
305
See Exec. Order No. 12110, 44 Fed. Reg. 1069 (1978).
3 0 6See Marblestone, "The Coverage of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act," 35 Fed. Bar J. 119 (1976); Marblestone, "The Relationship Between
the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory Committee
Act," 36 Fed. Bar J. 65 (1977).
3 0 7See 5 U.S.C. App. I H§ 10(a)(1) and (d); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
3 0 8 See 5 U.S.C. App. 1 § 10b; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I have argued in this thesis that bargaining processes -- both
negotiation and mediation -- may often be attractive alternatives to adver-
sarial processes for the resolution of environmental conflict. In par-
ticular, these informal processes may lower the costs of dispute resolu-
tion, achieve agreement in less time than formal procedures, and offer
more innovative and "tailored" solutions than are possible through liti-
gation.
Environmental dispute resolution through bargaining does have prob-
lems, however. In particular, it may be difficult to implement a consen-
sual agreement, negotiated or mediated by private parties, when the subject
matter of the agreement is within the jurisdiction of a government agency.
Also, the complex nature of environmental disputes and notions of the
"public interest" that arise in environmental conflict can make agreement
difficult. I have argued that the participation of government agencies
in the bargaining process may help to address these problems.
In earlier chapters, I showed that the incentives for agency parti-
cipation -- most notably achieving voluntary compliance and conserving
agency resources -- should, theoretically, be sufficient to encourage
agency participation in some cases. I also indicated some models for
agency participation in environmental dispute resolution and showed how
traditional procedures, such as consent orders, could be adopted for use
in environmental cases.
Finally, I addressed the legal issues involved in maintaining the
confidentiality of bargaining processes when government agencies partici-
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pate. There, I showed that strong policy arguments could be made for
maintaining confidentiality for bargaining purposes and that there was
support for that argument in the legislative history of the statutes, in
the works of scholars, and in the courts.
What remains for discussion is the issue I mentioned briefly in
Chapter Four, the allied questions of agency discretion and judicial re-
view. In this Conclusion, I will examine these questions and provide
recommendations for agency practice that address the real policy concerns
they raise. Finally, I will indicate some directions for further inquiry
in the area of environmental dispute resolution.
The "Problem" of Agency Discretion
There is great room for concern whenever a proposed policy hints at
an expansion of discretionary power for government. As Professor Jaffe
has noted, "We may grant that power is benign and without it we can do
nothing. But it is also malign, fearsome, hateful, and dangerous." 3 0 9
The recent national experience of Watergate is but the latest ex-
ample of "hateful and dangerous" power being used against the public by
government officials. The problem with discretionary use of power is
that, absent rules and standards for its guidance, power may be exercised
arbitrarily and capriciously so that "the imperfections of human nature
are often reflected in the choices made."3 1 0
But there are also advantages to discretion. With the wise use of
3 0 9Jaffe, supra note 66, at 322-23.
3 1 0Davis, supra note 174, at v.
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discretionary power, a decision-maker can "take into account the need for
tailoring results to the unique facts and circumstances of individual
cases." 3 1 1  Thus, in the view of Professor Davis, we must not confuse the
312
existence of discretionary power with the abuse of discretionary power. ,
By proposing a greater role for government agencies in informal, un-
structured, and consensual bargaining processes, I am clearly envisioning
a grant of additional discretionary power to the agencies. In fact, I have
argued that such discretion is often necessary to address the novel and
complex problems posed by environmnental disputes. The question now, of
course, is how to prevent this additional discretion from being abused.
First, what does it mean to "abuse" discretion? Professor Davis
provides an example:
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division institutes a prosecution against a corporation.
His successor, disagreeing with his prosecution policy,
dismisses the prosecution, without stating facts, without
stating reasons, without publicly relating the case to
policies developed in other similar cases, and without
any public statement of the basic policies involved.3 1 3
The abusive element here seems to be the absence of any justification for
the choice made; thus, there is no basis whatever for determining whether
the new prosecutor had acted in a reasonable, considered, and ethical man-
ner in dismissing the case. But the provision of a "reason" -- even one
that appears to be sufficient -- is not enough to guarantee that discre-
tion is not abused. Commenters have noted that a requirement that choices
3113Davis, supra note 174, at 17.
Id., at 19.
Id., at 11; see also Id., at 9-12.
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be substantiated by statements of reasons for the choice, absent the pos-
sibility of further inquiry, "may degenerate into self-serving boiler-
plate.,,314 In other words, if the decision-maker knows that no one will
peer behind the stated reasons justifying his choices, he may simply in-
vent some reasonable statement that supports his choice, knowing that his
true reasons will remain unearthed.
In the context of agency participation in bargaining processes,
this concern regarding an abuse of discretion may, at first, appear to be
justified. After all, I have argued that the confidentiality of the pro-
cess should be maintained and so the very records that could be used to
challenge an agency statement of its reasons for a decision would be un-
available; in such a situation wouldn't the agency be free to fashion
whaLever self-serving statement it desired? Where would be the check on
agency decisions?
At closer examination, however, I feel that these problems recede
somewhat. In a consensual choice process there is a basic check on agency
discretion provided by the concerns of other parties and the need for
their agreement in a settlement. Here we have no agency official arbi-
trarily deciding on a policy; rather, contending parties with opposed in-
terests are included in the process and provide an important check on
agency discretion at every stage of the proceeding. But what if the neces-
representation of diverse interests is not present? Is there a check on
an agency if it participates in bargaining with only a few, hand-chosen
3 1 4Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 176, at 216.
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parties and then attempts to pass the settlement of f as representing the
consensus of all affected parties? How does the agency determine who is
an affected party? Does anyone examine that choice?
These questions indicate that problems remain even when the consen-
sual nature of the bargaining process assures that blatant agency abuse
of discretion is unlikely. In this next section, I address these concerns.
Structuring and Checking Discretion
Professor Davis believes that there are two basic ways to control
agency discretion: "structuring" and "checking". Structuring includes
agen cy -tatements of its plans, policies, rules, and decisions. Checking
involves both administrative and judicial supervision and review.315 By
utilizing both these methods, to varying degrees, agency discretion can
be appropriately confined without being destroyed.316 I am recommending,
therefore, that agency participation in environmental dispute resolution
efforts should be preceded by clear statements, on the part of the agency,
of the rules that are to be used in such an effort, and that courts should
be empowered to review agency actions to determine whether these announced
rules have been followed.
An agency should be required to state the procedures it uses to judge
when its participation in an environmental bargaining effort is worthwhile.
3 1 5 See Davis, supra note 174, at 55-56.
316
-Professor Davis is clear in stating that errors are made in the
direction of too much confinement of discretionary power as well as too
little. See Davis, supra note 174, at 52.
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The agency should be able to indicate the steps it will take to assure
all affected parties will be represented at the sessions. Agency planning
for environmental dispute resolution efforts -- for example, resource al-
location and personnel availability -- should be announced. Further, this
information should be published in the Federal Register and procedures
established for receiving comment on the proposals. These announcements
and publications will serve to erect a structure for agency participation
that is open to public and legislative scrutiny.
When agreements are reached in bargaining efforts, the agency should
announce them and, with due regard for confidentiality concerns, produce
as complete a record of the process as possible. There should be an oppor-
tunity for public comment on the proposed settlement and the agency should
provide for administrative review and consideration of such comments.
In short, I am advocating that the agencies confine their own dis-
cretion within appropriate limits as stated in rules published in advance
of any agency participation in environmental dispute resolution processes.
In addition, agencies should publish notice of their intent to participate
in any particular bargaining effort and take steps to insure that the
parties affected by such a process are included in the bargaining. At
this point, I am unprepared to suggest substantive guidelines for identi-
fication of affected parties or to suggest when, and under what circum-
stances, affected parties should be excluded from the process. These are
questions that need further examination.
These prospective rules should be fully reviewable as normal admin-
istrative procedures comprehended in the rule-making provisions of the
APA. In this way, a reviewing court will be able to determine whether
1~
- 111 -
the rules proposed by the agency are themselves unreasonable or an abuse
of discretion. It may also be desirable to consider court review of
agency decisions regarding participation of affected parties in bargaining
sessions, a task that courts have some competence with through their regu-
lation of class representatives in federal class action litigation.3 1 7
The issue that now remains is whether there should be judicial re-
view of the bargaining process or the settlement itself. I have stated
throughout this thesis that environmental bargaining efforts are no guar-
antee that settlements will be "good" and, leaving aside for the moment
the philosophical debate as to what is "good", there is clearly an interest
in preventing the implementation of "bad" settlements. But what is a
'"good" settlement and what is a "bad" settlement?
Many courts, when faced with this type of question, claim that they
can only determine whether proper procedures were followed, i.e., if the
accepted process has been followed, they will presume that the outcome is
acceptable. Thus, in the case of environmental bargaining, the court would
determine whether an agency followed its own rules and standards, whether
the decision was reasoned and supported by evidence, and whether the ac-
tion taken by the agency was within the range of discretion it had created
for itself. Such review is altogether proper, I feel, and should occur in
those instances when a consensual settlement is opposed by outside parties.
In fact, opposition by outside parties is probably a good indication that
something may be amiss. But what of judicial review of the substance of
3 1 7See Stewart, supra note 28, at 1743.
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the decision, the terms of the settlement itself? Should this occur?
Should the court go any further if it finds a decision to be reasonable
and supported by the evidence?
It is not immediately apparent that court review of the substance
of agency decision-making would be "better" than a system that left the
settlement with the discretion of the agency where consensual processes
are at work. In fact, courts have generally adopted a laissez-faire at-
titude towards consent decrees and settlements, almost always holding
them immune from third party attack.318 But this may be a changing con-
cept. In 1974, with passage of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act,319 Congress for the first time provided for court review of antitrust
consent settlements to determine if they are in the "public interest".
What concerned the Congress was that the Justice Department and defendants
could enter into a settlement that would be opposed to larger public con-
cerns.
The Act requires the court to make a "public interest" determination
before entering a proposed decree and authorizes the use of a number of
devices in reaching this determination.320 These include: a "competitive
impact statement" furnished the court by the Justice Department; publicity
for the decree and the statement; a sixty-day comment period; the use of
expert witnesses; the use of a special master or outside consultants;
318See Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 176, at 208.
3 1 9Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 2, 88 Stat. 1706, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h)
(1976).
1_., at § 16(e).
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321
solicitation of additional information; and a provision for intervention.
Thus, the Act provides for a full range of judicial devices whose aim is
to determine whether the "public interest" has been served. But, the Act
has been soundly criticized for its failure to identify just what the
"public interest" might be and to define it. 3 2 2 Since, in my view, any
unitary concept of the "public interest" is absurd, what the Act is really
attempting to do, I feel, is to insure that consent decrees in antitrust
cases are not wholly opposed to more general concerns. Should such a pro-
cedure be used for consensual agreements to environmental disputes?
I think not. If a reviewing court will look long and hard at the
procedures used by the agency in reaching settlement, and is satisfied
that the agency has followed its own announced rules, I feel that the agree-
ment should be allowed to stand. I am simply not persuaded that the formal
adjudicatory process of judicial review can provide a better substantive
pnswer than that furnished by a well-conducted bargaining process. It is
not obvious to me that the public's interest would be better served by the
availability of substantive court review. The costs of overseeing agency
decisions would simply outweigh the benefits. In fact, one of the main
advantages of consensual agreements, the efficient use of agency resources,
would be lost by requiring elaborate agency defenses of its actions. Fur-
ther, the mere threat of bringing such litigation before a court would
likely induce the agency to reject the consensual agreement and thus avoid
32116 U.S.C. § 16(f) (1976).
3 2 2 See Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 176.
11 t
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the onerous process of substantive review. Finally, I doubt the compe-
tence of the courts to make such decisions, and fear the drain on scarce
judicial resources that would result from a review that attempted to de-
termine the "public interest". I feel that procedural review is suffi-
cient, when combined with announced agency restrictions on its own dis-
cretion, to guard against possible abuse.
Additional Questions and Directions for Further Inquiry
In this thesis, I have only begun to address the questions posed
when we attempt to use consensual agreements for resolving environmental
disputes. While the issue of confidentiality for bargaining processes now
seems clear to me, there is still a great deal of work that remains on the
issues of the scope of agency discretion and means for insuring that dis-
cretion is not abused. In particular, I need to devise more precise re-
commendations for agency "structuring" of its own bargaining processes
and for agency and court "checks" on agency discretion.
Another very useful area of inquiry is the possible need for statu-
tory changes to facilitate the participation of government agencies in
bargaining processes. Will amendment of the Administrative Procedure Act
be the best way to accomplish this, or would it be preferable to restruc-
ture the procedures mandated by substantive statutes?
A great deal remains to be learned about both how to identify "nego-
tiable" disputes and how best to approach the bargaining process once it
has begun. Can we learn how to predict what is a "negotiable" dispute?
If not, will that serve as a powerful disincentive to agency participa-
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tion because of the agency's aversion to a risky enterprise? If the bar-
gaining process does get underway, how should it proceed? Is there some
general way of approaching environmental disputes or is each conflict
unique and amenable to resolution only on its own particular terms?
Finally, we need to know much more about the role of mediation in
the bargaining process. The mediator may represent the last chance to
achieve settlement, yet, at present, we know very little about what con-
stitutes effective practice. An exploration of the current processes of
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the area of labor nego-
tiations seems to be called for.
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